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Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data-Breach Harms 
Daniel J. Solove* & Danielle Keats Citron** 
In lawsuits about data breaches, the issue of harm has confounded courts. 
Harm is central to whether plaintiffs have standing to sue in federal court and 
whether their legal claims are viable. Plaintiffs have argued that data breaches 
create a risk of future injury, such as identity theft, fraud, or damaged 
reputations, and that breaches cause them to experience anxiety about this risk. 
Courts have been reaching wildly inconsistent conclusions on the issue of harm, 
with most courts dismissing data-breach lawsuits for failure to allege harm. A 
sound and principled approach to harm has yet to emerge. 
In the past five years, the U.S. Supreme Court has contributed to the 
confusion. In 2013, the Court, in Clapper v. Amnesty International, concluded 
that fear and anxiety about surveillance—and the cost of taking measures to 
protect against it—were too speculative to satisfy the “injury in fact” 
requirement to warrant standing. This past term, the U.S. Supreme Court stated 
in Spokeo v. Robins that “intangible” injury, including the “risk” of injury, 
could be sufficient to establish harm. When does an increased risk of future 
injury and anxiety constitute harm? The answer remains unclear. Little progress 
has been made to harmonize this troubled body of law, and there is no coherent 
theory or approach. 
In this Article, we examine why courts have struggled to conceptualize 
harms caused by data breaches. The difficulty largely stems from the fact that 
data-breach harms are intangible, risk-oriented, and diffuse. Harms with these 
characteristics need not confound courts; the judicial system has been 
recognizing intangible, risk-oriented, and diffuse injuries in other areas of law. 
We argue that courts are far too dismissive of certain forms of data-breach harm 
and can and should find cognizable harms. We demonstrate how courts can 
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assess risk and anxiety in a concrete and coherent way, drawing upon existing 
legal precedent. 
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Introduction 
Suppose that Company X fails to adequately secure its clients’ personal 
data. Imagine the company knows that hackers previously accessed its 
system yet does nothing about it. This time, hackers have little difficulty 
accessing the company’s computer network to steal sensitive personal data 
about thousands of individuals. In the hackers’ hands are now the keys to 
those individuals’ credit and bank accounts: Social Security numbers, birth 
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dates, and financial information. The company’s clients bring suit, seeking 
compensation for their increased risk of identity theft, the money they spent 
monitoring credit activity, and the ensuing emotional distress. 
The defining issue in this lawsuit will be harm. If plaintiffs bring suit in 
federal court, they will have to demonstrate that they suffered harm sufficient 
to establish Article III standing.1 Beyond the hurdle of standing, plaintiffs 
will have to establish harm to recover under tort, contract, or other claims in 
both federal and state courts. 
In the past two decades, plaintiffs in hundreds of cases have sought 
redress for data breaches caused by inadequate data security.2 In most 
instances, there is evidence that the defendants failed to use reasonable care 
in securing plaintiffs’ data. The majority of the cases, however, have not 
turned on whether the defendants were at fault. Instead, the cases have been 
bogged down with the issue of harm. No matter how derelict defendants 
might be with regard to security, no matter how much warning defendants 
have about prior hacks and breaches, if plaintiffs cannot show harm, they 
cannot succeed in their lawsuits. 
The concept of harm stemming from a data breach has confounded the 
lower courts. There has been no consistent or coherent judicial approach to 
data-breach harms. More often than not, a plaintiff’s increased risk of 
financial injury and anxiety is deemed insufficient to warrant recognition of 
harm,3 even though the law has evolved in other areas to redress such injuries. 
 
1. Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979). The issue of standing 
also comes up in state courts adjudicating data-breach claims. See, e.g., Maglio v. Advocate Health 
& Hosps. Corp., 40 N.E.3d 746, 753–55 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (explaining that federal standing 
principles are similar to those in Illinois and in turn dismissing data-breach claims under Illinois 
law because the risk of identity theft and emotional distress did not amount to injury in fact sufficient 
to support standing). 
2. See Sasha Romanosky et al., Empirical Analysis of Data Breach Litigation, 11 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 74, 93 (2014) (noting the 231 federal data-breach lawsuits from 2000–2011). 
3. See Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 40, 43 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding that increased risk 
of identity theft is too speculative a harm in a case involving the theft of personal data); Peters v. 
St. Joseph Servs. Corp., 74 F. Supp. 3d 847, 849–50, 854–55 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (same); Storm v. 
Paytime, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 359, 366 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (same); In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. 
(SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 14, 25, 28 (D.D.C. 2014) (same); Polanco v. 
Omnicell, Inc., 988 F. Supp. 2d 451, 470–71 (D.N.J. 2013) (same). But see Galaria v. Nationwide 
Mut. Ins., 663 Fed. App’x 384, 388 (6th Cir. 2016) (recognizing that increased risk of identity theft 
and reasonably incurred mitigation costs to avoid future harm were sufficient for standing because 
hackers allegedly had stolen plaintiffs’ information and the defendant offered free credit monitoring 
services to help consumers mitigate danger); Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 
963, 967, 969 (7th Cir. 2016) (concluding that there was a substantial risk of harm and mitigation 
costs to suffice as injury for standing); Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 
2010) (stating that increasing the future risk of harm can be sufficient for injury in fact); In re Home 
Depot Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 1:14-md-2583-TWT, 2016 WL 2897520, at *1, *3 
(N.D. Ga. May 17, 2016) (finding harm to the plaintiffs (financial institutions) to warrant standing 
in a case concerning hackers’ breach of Home Depot’s databases because the plaintiffs incurred 
costs to avoid future harm including costs to cancel and reissue cards, costs to investigate fraudulent 
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The courts’ refusal to recognize data-breach harms is, in no small part, 
due to confusion created by the Supreme Court decision in Clapper v. 
Amnesty International USA.4 In Clapper, attorneys, journalists, and human-
rights activists challenged the constitutionality of a provision of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which expanded the government’s 
authority to conduct surveillance over suspected terrorists.5 Because the 
plaintiffs’ work involved communicating with foreign individuals who might 
be deemed suspicious by the government, the plaintiffs believed that their 
communications would be monitored.6 They spent significant money and 
time protecting the confidentiality of these communications, such as traveling 
abroad to speak with clients rather than talking to them on the phone.7 
As the Court in Clapper explained, standing requires plaintiffs to have 
suffered an “injury in fact”—injury that is concrete, particularized, and actual 
or imminent (as opposed to hypothetically possible).8 The Court 
acknowledged that the plaintiffs’ theory of harm might be correct, but found 
that there was no proof that surveillance had, in fact, happened or was about 
to occur (or even that there was a substantial risk of its occurring in the 
future).9 The proof sought by the Court was absent because, according to the 
government, the surveillance program had to be kept secret.10 Thus, because 
the plaintiffs had no definitive way to find out about the surveillance until 
Edward Snowden forced the government’s hand months later, the harm was 
merely conjectural.11 The Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue 
because they could not show that the actual injury of government surveillance 
was underway or “certainly impending.”12 The plaintiffs’ case was remanded 
 
charges, costs for customer fraud monitoring, and costs due to lost interest and fees due to reduced 
card usage). 
4. 568 U.S. 398 (2013). 
5. Id. at 401, 427. 
6. Id. at 401. 
7. Id. at 406–07. For a thoughtful analysis of Clapper, see Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of 
Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1935, 1963 (2013) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Clapper and arguing for the adoption of principles to guide the future development of surveillance 
law in order to balance the costs and benefits of government surveillance). 
8. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409. 
9. Id. at 421–22. 
10. Brief for Petitioner at 35, Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013) (No. 11-
1025); see Clapper, 568 U.S. at 412 & n.4 (insisting the burden to plead specific facts remained on 
plaintiffs despite the secrecy of those facts). 
11. See id. at 412 (“Moreover, because § 1881a at most authorizes—but does not mandate or 
direct—the surveillance that respondents fear, respondents’ allegations are necessarily 
conjectural.”). 
12. Id. at 422. 
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because the plaintiffs could only speculate about whether their 
communications were under surveillance.13 
Although the Clapper Court focused on the fact that the plaintiffs could 
not show that government surveillance was imminent or certainly impending, 
it stated in a footnote that “[i]n some instances,” a “substantial risk that the 
harm will occur” would be sufficient to confer standing upon a plaintiff.14 
The Court failed to elaborate more on this point. 
In decision after decision, courts have relied on Clapper to dismiss data-
breach cases. For example, in Reilly v. Ceridian Corp.,15 the case upon which 
the opening hypothetical is based, the Third Circuit held that the plaintiffs 
did not suffer harm because their “conjectures” about being victimized by 
identity theft or fraud had not yet “come true.”16 Plaintiffs’ concerns about 
increased risk of identity theft and their outlay of money to protect against 
such theft were based “on entirely speculative, future actions of an unknown 
third-party.”17 Because thieves had not yet misused the plaintiffs’ data, there 
was no “actual” harm to warrant standing or redress.18 The court summarily 
rejected the plaintiffs’ emotional distress claims for lack of standing.19 
Much like Reilly, the majority of courts have ruled that injuries from 
data breaches are too speculative and hypothetical, too reliant on subjective 
fears and anxieties, and not concrete or significant enough to warrant 
recognition.20 Courts have held that the “mere increased risk of identity theft 
 
13. The Clapper case comes with a dose of cruel irony. Although the government diminished 
the plaintiffs’ concerns about surveillance by arguing that the plaintiffs could not prove that they 
were subject to it, the government knew the answer all along, and because the program was 
classified as a state secret, the plaintiffs did not and could not know for sure that they were being 
subjected to surveillance. See Seth F. Kreimer, “Spooky Action at a Distance”: Intangible Injury in 
Fact in the Information Age, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 757 (2016) (describing the government’s 
strategy to avoid public judicial review of secret surveillance by combining secrecy with 
justiciability and standing). 
14. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414–15 n.5. In Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, the Court, quoting 
Clapper, held that “[a]n allegation of future injury may suffice if the threatened injury is ‘certainly 
impending,’ or there is a ‘“substantial risk” that the harm will occur.’” 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014). 
15. 664 F.3d 38 (3d Cir. 2011). 
16. Id. at 42. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 43. 
19. Id. at 46. 
20. See, e.g., Peters v. St. Joseph Servs. Corp., 74 F. Supp. 3d 847, 854 (S.D. Tex. 2015) 
(holding that the increased risk of future identity theft or fraud stemming from a data breach was 
not sufficient to constitute imminent injury); Storm v. Paytime, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 359, 363, 365–
66 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (reasserting Reilly by agreeing that increasing the risk of identity theft does not 
suffice as injury); In re Horizon Healthcare Servs., Inc. Data Breach Litig., No. 13-7418 (CCC), 
2015 WL 1472483, at *1, *5–6 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2015), vacated, 846 F.3d 625 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(holding that plaintiffs did not have standing in a case alleging imminent risk and harm of fraud 
stemming from the theft of several computers containing personal information that were held by 
defendants; plaintiffs were not able to show actual harm and could only speculate that future fraud 
may occur). 
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or identity fraud alone does not constitute a cognizable injury.”21 They have 
refused to find harm even in cases where hackers used malware to steal 
personal data and there was evidence of misuse of the data.22 Claims have 
been summarily dismissed on the grounds that plaintiffs have not suffered 
identity theft or could not show an imminent threat of financial injury.23 
Some courts, however, have pushed back against the trend and have 
found harm. The Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have found standing for 
victims of data breaches based on the increased risk of identity theft.24 In 
those cases, plaintiffs were found to have suffered actual, not hypothetical, 
injuries where hackers stole personal data from inadequately secured 
systems.25 In Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, the Seventh Circuit 
reasoned, “Why else would hackers break into a store’s database and steal 
consumers’ private information? Presumably, the purpose of the hack is, 
 
21. Green v. eBay Inc., No. 14-1688, 2015 WL 2066531, at *3 (E.D. La. May 4, 2015). 
22. E.g., Bradix v. Advance Stores Co., No. 16-4902, 2016 WL 3617717, *1–4 (E.D. La. July 6, 
2016) (dismissing claims for lack of injury in fact in a case where the plaintiff alleged that one of 
defendant’s employees gave employees’ names, Social Security numbers, and gross wages to a 
hacker who used the information in unauthorized attempts to secure vehicle financing that appeared 
on the plaintiff’s credit report because there was no proof that the attempts at fraud damaged the 
plaintiff’s credit score); In re SuperValu, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 14-MD-2586, 
2016 WL 81792 (D. Minn. Jan. 7, 2016) (finding no harm to support standing even though plaintiffs 
alleged that defendants released malicious software and disclosed payment card names and PINs 
because the only alleged misuse of personal data was a single unauthorized charge on one plaintiff’s 
credit card). 
23. E.g., In re Zappos.com, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 108 F. Supp. 3d 949, 958–
59 (D. Nev. 2015) (declining to find standing where partial credit card numbers of 24 million 
customers were stolen because there were no allegations of misuse or unauthorized purchases); 
Storm, 90 F. Supp. 3d at 366 (finding no standing because the plaintiffs did not allege that they 
“actually suffered any form of identity theft as a result of the data breach,” even though hackers had 
breached a payroll company’s computer system and accessed confidential, personal information). 
24. Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 663 F. App’x 384, 385–86 (6th Cir. 2016); Remijas v. 
Neiman Marcus Grp., 794 F.3d 688, 693–94 (7th Cir. 2015); Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 
1139, 1140 (9th Cir. 2010); In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 
1154, 1159 (D. Minn. 2014). 
25. See Galaria, 663 F. App’x at 385–86 (holding that substantial risk of harm, coupled with 
reasonably incurred mitigation costs, supported standing in a data-breach case because theft of 
personal data by ill-intentioned criminals placed them at continuing, increased risk of fraud and 
identity theft and the plaintiff suffered three unauthorized attempts to open credit cards in his name); 
Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693–94 (holding that the plaintiffs had standing to sue in the wake of breach 
even though they had not experienced fraudulent charges on their credit cards because those 
plaintiffs knew from the fact that other plaintiffs’ cards had been used fraudulently that their 
personal information had been stolen by individuals who intended to misuse it); Krottner, 628 F.3d 
at 1143 (holding increased risk of identity theft constituted an injury in fact where someone had 
attempted to open a bank account using stolen personal data because plaintiffs had alleged a 
“credible threat of real and immediate harm stemming from the theft of the laptop” with the 
unencrypted names, addresses, and Social Security numbers of 97,000 employees); In re Target 
Corp., 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1157–59 (holding that unlawful charges, restricted or blocked access to 
bank accounts, inability to pay bills, and late payment charges or new card fees incurred by the 
plaintiffs constituted injuries in fact in the wake of the theft of credit card and personal data of 110 
million customers). 
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sooner or later, to make fraudulent charges or assume those consumers’ 
identities.”26 Courts have also held that plaintiffs faced a substantial risk of 
harm, sufficient to support standing, where the stolen data was posted on file-
sharing websites for identity thieves.27 
Despite these decisions, the weight of authority has leaned against 
finding harm. Data-breach lawsuits remained an area of unease, with courts 
struggling to develop a consistent and coherent approach. In data-breach 
cases, the nature of the injury has seemingly befuddled the courts. 
In 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins28 attempted 
to clarify the harm required for standing when injuries result from the 
mishandling of personal data. Yet far from providing guidance, the opinion 
fostered even more confusion about informational harms. In Spokeo, the 
plaintiff alleged that the defendant, a “people search engine,” violated the 
federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) when it published false 
information about him.29 The defendant’s dossier asserted that the plaintiff 
was wealthy, married with children, and worked in a professional field 
though he was none of those things.30 The plaintiff alleged that the 
inaccuracies in the defendant’s dossier damaged his employment chances by 
suggesting that he was overqualified and that he might be unwilling to 
relocate because of responsibilities to his nonexistent family.31 The district 
court found that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue under Article III because 
the alleged injury—the defendant’s publication of inaccurate information—
was not an injury in fact.32 
After the Ninth Circuit reinstated the plaintiff’s case on the grounds that 
an inaccurate credit report, allegedly violating a statutory right, amounted to 
a particularized injury sufficient to support standing,33 the Supreme Court 
granted the defendant’s writ for certiorari.34 In an opinion authored by Justice 
Alito, the Court instructed the Ninth Circuit to reconsider the standing 
question. The Court declared that the harm required for standing must be 
 
26. Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693. 
27. E.g., Corona v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., No. 14–CV–09600, 2015 WL 3916744, at *3 
(C.D. Cal. June 15, 2017) (holding allegations that stolen data had been posted on file-sharing 
websites, alongside allegations that the data had been used by actors to send threatening emails, was 
“alone sufficient” to establish standing); see also Galaria, 663 F. App’x at 385–86 (finding standing 
where plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that an “illicit international market for stolen data” 
exists). 
28. 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). 
29. Id. at 1544. 
30. Id. at 1546. 
31. Id. at 1556 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
32. Id. at 1546 (majority opinion). 
33. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 411–14 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated 136 S. Ct. 1540 
(2016). 
34. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1546. 
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“concrete,” yet it suggested that “intangible harm,” and even the “risk” of 
harm, could be sufficient to establish a concrete harm if intangible injury has 
a “close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as 
providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts.”35 
The Court failed to elaborate on how all this added up. It said nothing 
about the relationship between the concreteness of harm and the need for at 
least a substantial risk of harm as discussed in Clapper. When will increased 
risk of injury constitute a “substantial risk of harm”? Why are some 
intangible injuries sufficient for standing while others are not? Spokeo did 
little to clear up the confusion about harms related to the mishandling of 
personal data. 
Clapper and Spokeo have led to confusion about how harms involving 
personal data should be conceptualized. To many judges and policymakers, 
recognizing data-breach harms is akin to attempting to tap dance on 
quicksand, with the safest approach being to retreat to the safety of the most 
traditional notions of harm. Unfortunately, public conversation about data-
breach harms rarely delves into the muddy conceptual waters. With some 
noted exceptions, scholarship has not given the issue sufficient attention.36 
Ryan Calo has thoughtfully laid out historical and conceptual support for 
treating anxiety as privacy harm.37 In our view, anxiety and risk, together and 
alone, deserve recognition as compensable harms. 
 
35. Id. at 1549. 
36. Ryan Calo has done theoretically rich work on privacy harm, as has Paul Ohm. See, e.g., 
M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131, 1133 (2011) [hereinafter 
Boundaries] (making the case that the boundaries of privacy harms can be distilled to objective 
harms and subjective harms); Ryan Calo, Privacy Harm Exceptionalism, 12 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH 
TECH. L. 361, 361, 364 (2014) [hereinafter Exceptionalism] (arguing that courts have required 
litigants to move mountains to prove harm resulting from privacy violations unlike countless other 
areas where redress is required for negative externalities imposed on individuals); Paul Ohm, 
Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. 
REV. 1701, 1703–04 (2010) (asserting that privacy law is built around the mistaken principle that 
anonymized data cannot easily be “deanonymized” and that, accordingly, people are afforded much 
less privacy than they assume); Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1196 
(2015). Our previous work has tackled the issue as well. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, 
UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 8–9 (2008) (introducing a new theory of privacy that abandons the 
traditional way of conceptualizing privacy); Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 
98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805, 1831 (2010) [hereinafter Mainstreaming] (contending that courts should 
invoke established tort remedies to address unwanted intrusions and disclosure of personal 
information instead of creating new privacy torts); Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: 
The Evolution of Public and Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 
241, 243–45 (2007) [hereinafter Reservoirs]. 
37. Calo, Boundaries, supra note 35, at 1144–48; Calo, Exceptionalism, supra note 35, at 362–
63. Calo argues that privacy harms have an objective component, which involves unanticipated or 
coerced use of personal information to an individual’s disadvantage, and a subjective one, which 
involves the unwanted perception of observation. Calo, Boundaries, supra note 35, at 1144, 1148. 
Calo’s framework recognizes anxiety suffered in the wake of a data breach as cognizable 
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This issue cries out for attention. The number of people affected by data 
breaches continues to rise as companies collect more and more personal data 
in inadequately secured data reservoirs.38 Risk and anxiety are injuries in the 
here and now. Victims of data breaches have an increased risk of identity 
theft, fraud, and reputational damage. Once victims learn about breaches, 
they may be chilled from engaging in activities that depend on good credit, 
like house- and job-hunting. Data-breach victims might decline to search for 
a new home or employment since there is an increased chance that lenders or 
employers will find their credit reports marred by theft.39 They face an 
increased chance of being preyed upon by blackmailers, extortionists, and 
fraudsters promising quick fixes in exchange for data or money.40 Emotional 
distress is a crucial aspect of the suffering. Knowing that thieves may be 
using one’s personal data for criminal ends can produce significant anxiety. 
Because companies do not have to internalize these negative externalities 
borne by individuals, the number of data breaches continues to grow.41 Data 
breaches have become an epic problem. 
In this Article, we focus on data-breach harms. We explore why courts 
have struggled with the issue, and we offer an approach to address data-
breach harms that has roots in existing law. In what follows, we explore the 
nature of data-breach harms and demonstrate how the law is far from closed 
off to recognizing them. We show that there are ample conceptual 
foundations in the law to address risk and anxiety and thus to recognize data-
breach harms. In some areas, the law has been developing gingerly in the 
direction of recognizing concepts helpful to recognizing data-breach harms; 
 
(subjective) harm, but does not recognize increased risk of identity theft and fraud as a cognizable 
(objective) harm. Id. at 1156. 
38. See Lily Hay Newman, If You Want to Stop Big Data Breaches, Start with Databases, 
WIRED (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/03/want-stop-big-data-breaches-start-
databases/ [https://perma.cc/7WS2-MVEB] (observing that data breaches often result from 
databases “with outdated and weak default security configurations”); At Mid-Year, U.S. Data 
Breaches Increase at Record Pace, IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CTR. (July 18, 2017), 
http://www.idtheftcenter.org/Press-Releases/2017-mid-year-data-breach-report-press-release 
[https://perma.cc/3F9H-CZV2] (reporting that in the first half of 2017, data breaches reached a half-
year record high). 
39. See Ron Lieber, Why the Equifax Breach Stings So Bad, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/22/your-money/equifax-breach.html [https://perma.cc/AQ57-
REQA] (stating that home loan officers and employers check credit scores and bad credit scores 
will likely yield rejections from both). 
40. Sarah Perez, Scammers Now Targeting Anthem Data Breach Victims Via Email and Phone, 
TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 9, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/02/09/scammers-now-targeting-
anthem-data-breach-victims-via-email-and-phone/ [https://perma.cc/3Q3V-8XL9]. 
41. See IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CTR., supra note 38 (reporting on the record increase in 
data breaches in recent years); Benjamin Dean, Sorry Consumers, Companies Have Little Incentive 
to Invest in Better Cybersecurity, QUARTZ (Mar. 5, 2015), https://qz.com/356274/cybersecurity-
breaches-hurt-consumers-companies-not-so-much/ [https://perma.cc/6BH7-Z4GW] (arguing that 
private companies lack incentive to invest in information security because other parties typically 
bear the costs resulting from data breaches). 
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in other areas of the law, such concepts are widely accepted yet remain 
sequestered from similar kinds of harm in other contexts. 
The past century has witnessed great advances in how the law deals with 
risk and anxiety. Risk is readily addressed, quantified, and factored into 
business decisions. Despite this progress, many courts in data-breach cases 
seem to freeze in the headlights and find risk too difficult to assess. Ironically, 
the very companies being sued for data breaches make high-stakes decisions 
about cyber security based upon an analysis of risk. Indeed, in areas of law 
beyond data-breach cases, courts have developed robust and concrete 
understandings of risk.42 Sufficient foundations in law exist for courts to 
assess increased risk of harm in data-breach cases. 
Anxiety is also readily dismissed on the grounds that it is too speculative 
and insubstantial to serve as a basis of cognizable harm in data-breach 
cases.43 In other contexts, however, courts routinely accept various forms of 
emotional distress, including anxiety, as sufficient harm.44 Indeed, in some 
areas, the issue of harm is not even discussed in most cases and is rarely an 
issue on appeal.45 For example, the privacy torts, recognized in the vast 
majority of states, allow plaintiffs to recover for the disclosure of private 
information or the improper intrusion into private matters resulting in 
emotional distress if the defendant’s conduct is “highly offensive to the 
reasonable person.”46 The tort of breach of confidentiality recognizes 
emotional distress as a cognizable injury without the need to show highly 
offensive conduct.47 
If a news media site published a nude photo or sex video of a person 
without consent, the plaintiff could prevail without establishing financial 
losses or physical injury because the gravamen of the harm is emotional 
distress.48 Recently, the famous former pro wrester Hulk Hogan won $115 
million in compensatory damages from media site Gawker for posting a sex 
video involving him without his consent. In cases involving data breaches or 
improper sharing of data, however, claims of emotional distress are dismissed 
as insufficient without even a whisper of the extensive body of law under the 
privacy torts that establishes otherwise. Why does the embarrassment over a 
sex video amount to $115 million worth of harm but the anxiety over the loss 
 
42. See infra section II(A)(2). 
43. Dana Post, Plaintiffs Alleging Only “Future Harm” Following a Data Breach Continue to 
Face a High Bar, INT’L ASS’N OF PRIVACY PROF’LS (Jan. 28, 2014), https://iapp.org/news/ 
a/plaintiffs-alleging-only-future-harm-following-a-data-breach-continue-to-fa/ [https://perma.cc/ 
PX7K-KHZH]. 
44. See infra section II(B)(2). 
45. See cases cited infra notes 181–93. 
46. Citron, Mainstreaming, supra note 36, at 1827. 
47. DAVID A. ELDER, PRIVACY TORTS § 3:8 (2002). 
48. See infra section II(B)(2). 
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of personal data (such as a Social Security number and financial information) 
amount to no harm? 
This Article has three parts: In Part I, we discuss the way that courts are 
currently deciding cases involving data-breach harms. In Part II, we explore 
why the law struggles with recognizing privacy and security violations as 
having caused cognizable harm. In Part III, we demonstrate that there are 
foundations in the law for a coherent recognition of harm based upon 
increased risk and anxiety. We build on this foundation, offering a framework 
for courts to assess risk and anxiety in a principled and consistent way. 
I.  The Emerging Law of Data-Breach Harms 
Harm is indispensable to most private law claims. Generally speaking, 
harm is understood as the impairment, or setback, of a person, entity, or 
society’s interests.49 People or entities suffer harm if they are in worse shape 
than they would be in had the activity not occurred.50 Harm frustrates a 
person’s ability to “fashion a life . . . that is distinctively and authentically 
hers.”51 Harm can involve the impairment of a person’s interest in physical 
integrity, “intellectual acuity, emotional stability, the absence of groundless 
anxieties and resentments, the capacity to engage normally in social 
intercourse . . . a tolerable social and physical environment, and a certain 
amount of freedom from interference and coercion.”52 
A legally cognizable harm is harm that the law recognizes as worthy of 
redress, deterrence, or punishment.53 Reasonable foreseeability of harm is a 
fundamental principle of much of private law.54 Plaintiffs must prove harm 
even if the defendant indisputably acted wrongly and violated the law. In tort 
suits, plaintiffs must prove that they were injured by the defendant’s actions. 
In The Common Law, Oliver Wendell Holmes identified harm as the evil 
 
49. JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS: THE MORAL LIMITS OF CRIMINAL LAW 34 (1984) 
(explaining that harm involves the thwarting, setting back, or defeating of a person or entity’s 
interest). Competing accounts of harm argue that harm involves events that are bad to suffer or 
impose conditions that impair agency. Id. 
50. JOEL FEINBERG, Wrongful Life and the Counterfactual Element in Harming, in FREEDOM 
& FULFILLMENT: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 3, 4 (1992); see Stephen Perry, Harm, History, and 
Counterfactuals, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1283, 1292 (2003) (exploring a concept of harm as a 
“historical worsening,” which may involve a subsequent counterfactual analysis). 
51. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance 
of Harm, 5 LEGAL THEORY 117, 123–24 (1999). 
52. FEINBERG, supra note 49, at 37. 
53. As Joel Feinberg explains, harms may involve invasions or setbacks to interests but not all 
invasions of interests are worthy of law’s attention. FEINBERG, supra note 48, at 34–35. Law may 
ignore the wrongful behavior causing harm because the defendant acted justifiably or the targeted 
individual had no right to expect that his interests be protected. Id. 
54. Gregory C. Keating, When is Emotional Distress Harm?, in TORT LAW: CHALLENGING 
ORTHODOXY 273, 273 (Stephen G.A. Pitel et al. eds., 2013). 
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against which tort law was directed.55 Regardless of whether the defendant 
acted negligently, recklessly, or intentionally—no matter how wrongful the 
defendant’s conduct may have been—if harm is not proven, then plaintiffs 
cannot obtain relief.56 To be sure, legislation sometimes permits statutory 
damages or includes liquidated damages provisions, which permit redress 
without additional showings of harm.57 The harm is understood as the 
interference with the right recognized in the statute, so long as the plaintiff 
has suffered some setback to tangible or intangible interests.58  
Beyond the substance of private law claims, federal courts require that 
plaintiffs have standing to bring suit in accord with Article III of the U.S. 
Constitution. Standing doctrine requires that plaintiffs allege an injury in 
fact.59 The injury must be concrete, particularized, and “actual or imminent, 
not conjectural or hypothetical.”60 If a plaintiff lacks standing to bring a 
claim, a federal court cannot hear it.61 
Although the requirements for standing and substantive causes of action 
are different, the issue of harm that undergirds both is strikingly similar. In 
most cases, the way courts think about harm for standing is nearly identical 
to the way courts approach harm in substantive claims. We focus on harm 
because it is central to the jurisprudence of private law claims. 
No matter whether harm is raised for the purposes of standing or 
determining the cognizability of private claims, harm drives the way courts 
 
55. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 64 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963) 
(“The business of the law of torts is to fix the dividing lines between those cases in which a man is 
liable for harm which he has done, and those in which he is not.”); see also Thomas C. Grey, 
Accidental Torts, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1225, 1272 (2001) (exploring Holmes’s harm-based approach). 
56. In certain circumstances, there may be distinct criminal laws and regulatory enforcement 
that would punish the defendant. In the absence of such penalties, the defendant can engage in the 
wrongdoing and violate the law without suffering any penalty. 
57. Copyright law is a prime example of statutory damages without harm. See 17 U.S.C. 
§ 504(c)(1) (2012) (stating that the copyright owner may at any time before a final judgment recover 
“an award of statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action” instead of “actual 
damages and profits”). 
58. See Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (explaining that concrete injuries may 
be both tangible and intangible, and that “[i]n determining whether an intangible harm constitutes 
injury in fact, both history and the judgment of Congress play important roles”). Some statutes like 
the Privacy Act of 1974 require an additional showing of harm for individuals to bring suit. See 
NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 763 (2011) (rejecting a claim under the act where plaintiffs alleged 
only a possibility of harm). Similarly, some state Unfair and Deceptive Practice acts (UDPA) permit 
consumers to seek compensation for losses caused by unfair and deceptive commercial practices 
only if those practices result in injury. See Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State 
Attorneys General, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747, 798 (2016) (“[P]rivate UDAP claims are 
routinely dismissed due to a lack of an ‘injury in fact’ sufficient to support a finding of standing or 
cognizable harms, or due to the economic loss rule.”). Because private UDAP claims require a 
showing of harm—whether or not statutes so require—courts routinely dismiss them. 
59. Friends of the Earth Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180 (2000). 
60. Id. 
61. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
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think about data-breach cases, most often resulting in their dismissal early in 
the litigation. Courts have found a lack of injury in fact to support standing 
or have concluded that there is no harm caused by various torts or other 
causes of action. In this Part, we examine how courts have conceptualized 
harm in their rejection of these claims. 
A. Judicial Approaches to Data-Breach Harms 
Data breaches usually involve various types of personal data, such as 
financial account information, driver’s license numbers, biometric markers, 
and Social Security numbers. The Office of Policy Management (OPM) 
breach leaked people’s fingerprints, background check information, and 
analyses of security risks.62 The Ashley Madison breach released information 
about people’s extramarital affairs.63 The Sony breach involved employee 
email.64 The Target breach resulted in the leaking of credit card information, 
bank account numbers, and other financial data.65 Other breaches result in the 
disclosure of passwords, children’s information, location data, and medical 
records. 
Plaintiffs in data-breach cases have pursued a number of causes of 
action, including negligence, privacy torts, and breach of fiduciary duty.66 
Other claims assert violations of state unfair and deceptive commercial acts 
and practice statutes (UDAP laws), state data security laws, the federal 
Privacy Act, and the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).67 In a study 
of 230 data-breach lawsuits between 2004 and 2014, plaintiffs brought more 
than eighty-six different causes of action.68 
 
62. Kim Zetter, The Massive OPM Hack Actually Hit 21 Million People, WIRED (July 9, 
2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/07/massive-opm-hack-actually-affected-25-million/ [https:// 
perma.cc/CK7S-EWBA]; Kim Zetter & Andy Greenberg, Why OPM Is A Security and Privacy 
Debacle, WIRED (June 11, 2015) http://www.wired.com/2015/06/opm-breach-security-privacy-
debacle/ [https://perma.cc/PUB3-QJHS]. 
63. Danielle Keats Citron & Maram Salaheldin, Leave the Cheaters in Peace: If You Poke 
Around the Ashley Madison Data, You’re Aiding and Abetting the Hackers, N.Y. DAILY NEWS 
(Aug. 24, 2015), http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/citron-salaheldin-leave-cheaters-peace-
article-1.2333852 [https://perma.cc/2R76-F69Y]. 
64. Kim Zetter, Sony Got Hacked Hard: What We Know and Don’t Know So Far, WIRED 
(Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/12/sony-hack-what-we-know/ [https://perma.cc 
/9K6N-SJKE]. 
65. Jim Finkle & David Henry, Exclusive: Target Hackers Stole Encrypted Bank PINs - Source, 
REUTERS (Dec. 24, 2013), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-target-databreach/exclusive-target-
hackers-stole-encrypted-bank-pins-source-idUSBRE9BN0L220131225 [https://perma.cc/G3VZ-
6RX2]; Kim Zetter, Target Admits Massive Credit Card Breach; 40 Million Affected, WIRED 
(Dec. 19, 2013), https://www.wired.com/2013/12/target-hack-hits-40-million/ [https://perma 
.cc/C6CJ-DY26]. 
66. Romanosky et al., supra note 2, at 100, 101 fig.7. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 102. 
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Data-breach cases are often filed in federal court or removed from state 
court under the federal Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA).69 Under CAFA, 
class actions can be removed to federal court for state-law claims exceeding 
$5 million where at least one member of the putative class and one defendant 
reside in different states.70 At the federal level, harm thus must often be 
established twice—first to make it past the hurdle of standing and second to 
satisfy the elements of various causes of action. 
Although plaintiffs advance a number of theories of harm, at bottom, 
their claims are based on three overarching theories: (1) data breaches create 
a risk of future injury, (2) plaintiffs take preventative measures to reduce the 
risk of injury, and (3) plaintiffs experience anxiety as a result of data breaches 
compromising their personal data. 
1. Risk of Future Injury.—A common theory advanced by plaintiffs is 
that a data breach has increased their risk of future identity theft or fraud. The 
majority of courts reject that theory of harm. Plaintiffs’ increased risk of 
identity theft is regarded as too speculative a harm even in cases where 
thieves allegedly stole personal data.71 Courts view the increased risk of 
identity theft not as an “actual injury” but rather as “speculation of future 
harm.”72 
The trend is that if a person’s personal data has not yet been used to 
commit identity theft or fraud, then courts find that plaintiffs have suffered 
no harm.73 In a case where plaintiffs’ sensitive financial data was accessed 
 
69. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2012). 
70. Id. § 1332(d)(2)(A). 
71. See, e.g., Forbes v. Wells Fargo Bank, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1020–21 (D. Minn. 2006) 
(granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment in a case involving the theft of personal 
data from the defendant’s system because there was no indication that the information on the stolen 
computers had been misused); Guin v. Brazos Higher Educ. Serv. Corp., No. Civ. 05-668 
RHK/JSM, 2006 WL 288483, at *6 (D. Minn. Feb. 7, 2006) (holding that the plaintiff did not raise 
a genuine issue of material fact on injury because there was no evidence that the thieves accessed 
the allegedly stolen data). 
72. E.g., In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litig., No. 12–cv–8617, 2013 WL 4759588, at *5 (N.D. 
Ill. Sept. 3, 2013) (dismissing a claim of harm based on increased risk of identity theft as speculation 
of future harm); Hammer v. Sam’s East, Inc., No. 12–cv–2618–CM, 2013 WL 3746573, at *3 (D. 
Kan. July 16, 2013) (“[N]o court has found that a mere increased risk of identity theft or fraud 
constitutes an injury in fact for standing purposes without some alleged theft of personal data or 
security breach.”). 
73. See, e.g., Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding that plaintiffs do 
not suffer harm until their information is misused); Hammond v. Bank of N.Y., No. 08 Civ. 
6060(RMB)(RLE), 2010 WL 2643307, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2010) (holding that plaintiffs 
lacked standing because they did not produce evidence to suggest their injuries were more than 
speculative); Bell v. Acxiom Corp., No. 4:06CV00485-WRW, 2006 WL 2850042, at *2 (E.D. Ark. 
Oct. 3, 2006) (dismissing the plaintiff’s negligence claim in a case in which the defendant’s 
databases that stored the plaintiff’s personal data was hacked because being at a higher risk for fraud 
is insufficient harm to warrant standing). 
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by unknown third parties, a federal district court dismissed the class suit 
alleging increased risk of identity fraud because plaintiffs’ “credit 
information and bank accounts look[ed] the same today as they did” before 
the breach.74 Because hackers had not opened new bank accounts or credit 
cards in plaintiffs’ names, there was no harm.75 This was true in Key v. DSW 
Inc.,76 where thieves gained access to the defendant shoe retailer’s computer 
system containing the financial data of 96,000 customers.77 The court found 
no harm because plaintiffs only alleged the possibility of being victimized 
“at some unidentified point in the indefinite future.”78 
For some courts, there are simply too many contingencies at play, 
including the varied skills and intent of third-party hackers, to warrant a 
finding of harm.79 In Fernandez v. Leidos, Inc.,80 for instance, the district 
court dismissed the plaintiff’s increased risk of harm in the wake of theft of 
backup tapes with his personal data because the capabilities and criminal 
intentions of the data thieves were speculative.81 
Even when plaintiffs quantify the extent to which the data breach has 
elevated their risk of future harm, courts still find the harm too speculative to 
proceed.82 In In re Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC) Backup 
Tape Data Theft Litigation,83 the plaintiffs argued that they were nearly ten 
times more likely to be victims of identity theft.84 The court found that the 
“degree by which the risk of harm has increased [wa]s irrelevant” because it 
failed to suggest that the harm was “certainly impending.”85 Another court 
sharpened the point, reasoning that identity theft was unlikely to happen in 
 
74. Storm v. Paytime, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 359, 366 (M.D. Pa. 2015). 
75. Id. 
76. 454 F. Supp. 2d 684 (S.D. Ohio 2006). 
77. Id. at 685–86. 
78. Id. at 690. 
79. See, e.g., Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 45 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Any damages that may 
occur [in data-breach cases with no allegations of misuse] are entirely speculative and dependent 
on the skill and intent of the hacker.” (citation omitted)); Stapleton v. Tampa Bay Surgery Ctr., Inc., 
No. 8:17-cv-1540-T-30AEP, 2017 WL 3732102, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2017) (“While Plaintiffs 
argue that the mere fact that there was data breach is sufficient to constitute imminent injury, the 
Court cannot agree with that sort of ipse dixit reasoning. Something more than the mere data breach 
must be alleged before Plaintiffs can show they have a substantial risk of injury.”). 
80. 127 F. Supp. 3d 1078 (E.D. Cal. 2015). 
81. Id. at 1086–88. 
82. E.g., Storm v. Paytime, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 359, 366–67 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (rejecting an 
increased risk of identity theft as a basis for injury “[e]ven though Plaintiffs may indeed be at greater 
risk of identity theft” because plaintiffs did not “allege that any of them [had] become actual victims 
of identity theft”); In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F. 
Supp. 3d 14, 28 (D.D.C. 2014) (“[I]ncreased risk of harm alone does not constitute an injury in 
fact.”). 
83. 45 F. Supp. 3d 14 (D.D.C. 2014). 
84. Id. at 25. 
85. Id. 
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the future since the plaintiffs had not experienced fraud in the year after the 
breach.86 
Although three Courts of Appeals have recognized increased risk of 
harm as cognizable, their cases involved allegations about the malicious 
purpose of hackers or actual or attempted misuses of leaked personal data.87 
In Remijas, the Seventh Circuit found the risk of harm “immediate and very 
real” because the data “was in the hands of hackers who used malware to 
breach the defendant’s systems,” and “fraudulent charges had shown up on 
the credit cards of some of its customers.”88 Moreover, the defendant 
“contacted members of the class to tell them they were at risk,” which the 
court viewed as an admission that the plaintiffs had suffered nonspeculative 
harm.89 In Krottner v. Starbucks Corp.,90 the Ninth Circuit conferred standing 
on the plaintiffs because there was a subsequent attempt to open a bank 
account with personal data following the theft of a laptop.91 
In most cases, however, increased risk of future injury fails as a theory 
of cognizable harm. The motives of those who obtained the data are 
unknown, and the plaintiffs have not yet suffered identity theft or other forms 
of financial fraud. It will not be clear who has the data or what they will do 
with it. Proving that the risk of harm is “certainly impending” is challenging 
because the harm from a data breach is not immediate. Even in many cases 
where hackers accessed personal data and their malicious motive can be 
inferred, courts have still refused to find harm.92 
 
86. Storm, 90 F. Supp. 3d at 366–67. 
87. See Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963, 967 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding 
an “increased risk of fraudulent charges and identity theft” constituted an injury “concrete enough 
to support a lawsuit” because the data had already been stolen); Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., 
794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[I]t is plausible to infer that the plaintiffs have shown a 
substantial risk of harm from the Neiman Marcus data breach. Why else would hackers break into 
a store’s database and steal consumers’ private information? Presumably, the purpose of the hack 
is, sooner or later, to make fraudulent charges or assume those consumers’ identities.”); Krottner v. 
Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1142–43 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding an allegation of increased risk 
of identity theft was sufficient to confer standing when plaintiffs alleged a specific instance of an 
attempt to use stolen information to open a bank account). 
88. Remijas, 794 F.3d at 690, 693; see also Danielle Citron, Some Good News for Data Breach 
Victims, for a Change, FORBES (July 21, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
daniellecitron/2015/07/21/some-good-news-for-data-breach-victims-for-a-change/ [https://perma 
.cc/DS3K-WY86] (explaining the significance of the Remijas court’s injury-in-fact holding). 
89. Remijas, 794 F.3d at 696; accord Lewert, 819 F.3d at 967 (finding credence in the risk of 
identity theft alleged by plaintiffs because the defendant had encouraged customers whose data had 
been stolen to monitor their credit reports). The Sixth Circuit’s recent Galaria decision similarly 
pointed to the defendant’s provision of credit monitoring as supporting increased risk of harm. 
Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 663 Fed. App’x 384, 388–89 (6th Cir. 2016). 
90. 628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010). 
91. Id. at 1142–43. 
92. See, e.g., Forbes v. Wells Fargo Bank, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1019, 1021 (D. Minn. 2006) 
(finding “no present injury or reasonably certain future injury to support damages for any alleged 
increased risk or harm” after theft of computers containing unencrypted customer information, 
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2. Preventative Measures to Protect Against Future Injury.—A related 
theory based on future risk of injury is that plaintiffs incur out-of-pocket costs 
to mitigate the risk of identity theft or fraud. They spend time and money 
placing alerts with credit reporting agencies and subscribing to identity-theft 
protection and credit-monitoring services. They devote time and money to 
monitor various accounts and go through the hassle of changing service 
providers to prevent further breaches. Plaintiffs contend that the cost of these 
measures presents a specific monetary value that can be associated with the 
improper exposure of personal data. Courts, however, often reject this theory 
of harm, viewing plaintiffs’ expenses as attempts to “manufacture” injury.93 
The preventative-measure theory of harm typically fails because it is 
based upon the increased-risk-of-future-injury theory.94 The concern of 
courts is that any plaintiff could find some measure to spend money to 
mitigate any risk. Said another way, monetary expenditures are viewed as too 
easy to manufacture. If such expenses were recognized as a cognizable 
injury, plaintiffs’ lawyers would just instruct their clients to spend time and 
money on mitigation measures to create harm. Having rejected the risk of 
future injury, courts reject the expenditure of time and money in the present 
to turn the risk of future injury into more cognizable monetary losses. 
3. Anxiety.—Plaintiffs have argued that data breaches caused them 
emotional distress (in particular, anxiety), but courts have rejected these 
claims nearly every time. As a federal district court in New Jersey noted, 
“[c]ourts across the country have rejected ‘emotional distress’ as a basis for” 
finding harm because plaintiffs’ fear of identity theft or fraud is based on 
speculative conclusions that personal data will be used in a malicious way.95 
According to one court, “[p]laintiffs’ bald assertion of ‘emotional 
distress including anxiety, fear of being victimized, harassment and 
embarrassment’ is unexplained by any facts at all, let alone facts plausibly 
 
including names, addresses, Social Security numbers, and account numbers); see also cases cited 
supra notes 71–86. 
93. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 422 (2013) (“We hold that 
respondents lack Article III standing because they cannot demonstrate that the future injury they 
purportedly fear is certainly impending and because they cannot manufacture standing by incurring 
costs in anticipation of non-imminent harm.”); Polanco v. Omnicell, Inc., 988 F. Supp. 2d 451, 470–
71 (D.N.J. 2013) (“Plaintiff’s decision to [incur expenses] was based entirely on her speculative 
belief . . . . Therefore, her assertion is one that claims injury for expenses incurred in anticipation of 
future harm, and is not sufficient for purposes of establishing Article III standing.”). 
94. See, e.g., Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 46 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[T]hey prophylactically 
spent money to ease fears of future third-party criminality. Such misuse is only speculative—not 
imminent. The claim that they incurred expenses in anticipation of future harm, therefore, is not 
sufficient to confer standing.”). 
95. Crisafulli v. Ameritas Life Ins., No. 13–5937, 2015 WL 1969176, at *4 (D.N.J. Apr. 30, 
2015). 
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suggesting emotional injury.”96 One court stated, “even if [the risk of identity 
theft] is enough to engender some anxiety” and, “even if their fears are 
rational,” plaintiffs lacked standing “based on risk alone.”97 As another court 
concluded: “Emotional distress in the wake of a security breach is insufficient 
to establish standing . . . .”98 Unless there is an “imminent threat” of personal 
data being used in a “malicious way,” plaintiffs’ anxiety and emotional 
suffering are viewed as insufficient to constitute harm.99 Most courts consider 
plaintiffs’ fear, anxiety, and psychic distress about their increased risk of 
identity theft and other abuses too remote to warrant recognition.100 
B. Cramped View of Harm: Visceral and Vested 
As the previous section has shown, cases are dismissed for lack of harm 
even when a company’s negligence has clearly caused a data breach. Even in 
the face of wrongful conduct by defendants, courts are denying plaintiffs 
redress. The reason is because courts view the harm in overly narrow ways. 
Courts insist that data-breach harms be visceral—easy to see, measure, and 
quantify.101 They require harms to be vested—already materialized in the 
here and now. Plaintiffs must experience physical, monetary, or property 
damage or, at least, the damage must be imminent.102 
This cramped understanding of harm harkens back to early conceptions 
of the common law. Nineteenth-century tort claims required proof of physical 
injury or property loss.103 Financial losses could be recovered in tort actions 
if defendants owed plaintiffs a special duty of care.104 Along these lines, 
 
96. Id. 
97. In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 
14, 26 (D.D.C. 2014); see also Maglio v. Advocate Health & Hosps. Corp., 40 N.E.3d 746, 755 (Ill. 
App. 2015) (suggesting that “speculative and conclusory” allegations of possible “anxiety and 
emotional distress” caused by data breaches do not give rise to standing). 
98. In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litig., No. 12–cv–8617, 2013 WL 4759588, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 
Sept. 3, 2013). 
99. Id. 
100. Amburgy v. Express Scripts, Inc., 671 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1053 (E.D. Mo. 2009). 
101. See, e.g., Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 45 (3d Cir. 2011) (emphasizing that a 
“quantifiable [rather than speculative] risk of damage” is necessary to establish data harm). 
102. See, e.g., Amburgy, 671 F. Supp. 2d at 1050, 1053–55 (asserting that the “injury or threat 
of injury must be concrete and particularized, actual and imminent; not conjectural or 
hypothetical”). 
103. Gregory C. Keating, The Priority of Respect Over Repair, 18 LEGAL THEORY J. 293, 332 
& n.97 (2012). 
104. See John A. Fisher, Secure My Data or Pay the Price: Consumer Remedy for the Negligent 
Enablement of Data Breach, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 215, 237–38 (“[T]he Economic Loss 
Rule operates to preclude recovery when the parties have a direct contractual relationship and 
damages are consequential (lost profits), rather than direct (property damage or personal injury).”). 
The economic loss rule does not apply when a defendant owes the plaintiffs a special duty of care. 
See In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1173–76 (D. Minn. 
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courts have recognized claims for privacy violations only where redress is 
sought for tangible financial losses.105 Courts have found sufficient injury in 
data-breach cases where the exposure of personal data has led to identity 
theft.106 But without proof of physical harm or financial loss, courts rarely 
recognize harm.107 
Requiring harm to be visceral and vested has severely restricted the 
recognition of data-breach harms, which rarely have these qualities. Data-
breach harms are not easy to see, at least not in any physical way. They are 
not tangible like broken limbs and destroyed property. Instead, the harm is 
intangible. Data breaches increase a person’s risk of identity theft or fraud 
and cause emotional distress as a result of that risk. 
Despite the intangible nature of these injuries, data breaches inflict real 
compensable injuries. Data breaches raise significant public concern and 
generate legislative activity.108 Would all this concern and activity exist if 
there were no harm? Why would more than 90% of the states pass data-
breach-notification laws in the past decade if breaches did not cause harm?109 
Why would the Federal Trade Commission and state attorneys general 
 
2014) (discussing special-relationship and independent-duty exceptions to the economic loss rule, 
allowing recovery of financial losses in tort). 
105. E.g., Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 800 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (finding a 
recoverable injury where the alleged privacy violation had deprived plaintiffs of the measurable, 
concrete financial value of their endorsement for advertising purposes); In re Barnes & Noble Pin 
Pad Litig., No. 12-cv-8617, 2013 WL 4759588, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2013) (noting that a 
fraudulent charge resulting from a private data breach would only create a cognizable injury if the 
charge was unreimbursed). 
106. E.g., Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1330 (11th Cir. 2012); Remijas v. Neiman 
Marcus Grp., 794 F.3d 688, 696–97 (7th Cir. 2015). It can, however, be difficult to pinpoint a single 
actor for the harm suffered in the wake of a data breach. There are many participants that contribute 
to the harm experience by identity-theft victims: the entities that leaked the data, the companies that 
allowed thieves to open up accounts in victims’ names, and the credit reporting agencies that 
assembled the faulty information and use it to report on people’s reputations. See Daniel J. Solove, 
Identity Theft, Privacy, and the Architecture of Vulnerability, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1227, 1260–61 
(2003) (assigning blame for identity theft to a broad group of private and governmental actors in 
addition to the thieves). When victims attempt to clean up their credit reports, they are often 
prevented from doing so by uncooperative credit-reporting agencies and creditors. Tara Siegel 
Bernard, TransUnion, Equifax and Experian Agree to Overhaul Credit Reporting Practices, N.Y. 
TIMES (March 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/10/business/big-credit-reporting-
agencies-to-overhaul-error-fixing-process.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/6Q5V-3QY2]. 
107. E.g., In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 4 A.3d 492, 496 (Me. 
2010) (holding that reasonable time and effort spent to mitigate possible future losses was not a 
cognizable harm in tort or implied contract). 
108. See Daniel R. Stoller, Massive Equifax Cyberattack May Push Congress on Breach Notice 
Law, BLOOMBERG BNA (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.bna.com/massive-equifax-cyberattack-
n57982087651/ [https://perma.cc/8U9D-M62D] (anticipating strong legislative response to the 
Equifax data breach based on past data-breach responses). 
109. Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Apr. 12, 2017), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breach-
notification-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/K3U2-UBB2]. 
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expend considerable time and resources pursuing data-breach cases?110 In 
short, if data breaches cause no harm, then why do federal and state law-
enforcement agencies devote resources to addressing them? 
Data-breach harms might be akin to invisible objects in the middle of a 
crowded room. We may not be able to see an invisible object, but we see how 
everyone is bumping into it, how they are changing where they stand because 
of it, how they are walking different routes to avoid it, and so on. The object 
is invisible to the naked eye, but it is having a significant effect and people 
are expending a lot of time and energy to deal with it. To understand its 
impact, the best approach is not to look directly at it. Instead, we need to look 
at the activity generated by it and around it. The same is true with data-breach 
harms. When data-breach harms are studied in isolation, the real harm can be 
difficult to see. As with the invisible object, one must step back and observe 
the reactions to the data breach. 
As we explore in Part II, in other areas of the law, conceptions of harm 
have evolved to recognize injury that is hard to see or measure. This is true 
for pain and suffering, loss of consortium, and other matters that are not easily 
translated into monetary terms. This is true for emotional distress and risk-
oriented injuries. Law has developed ways to arrive at dollar figures for these 
harms, and it should evolve to do so in the context of data-breach harms. 
II. Risk and Anxiety as Harms 
The nature of data-breach harms is a complex issue that courts have 
given far too little attention. In this Part, we explore why courts have 
struggled with risk and anxiety, the key dimensions to data-breach harms. 
We contend that these harms are far from fanciful or trivial. Data-breach 
harms are real, and compelling reasons exist for recognizing them. In this 
Part, we demonstrate that contrary to findings that no legal basis exists to 
recognize harm arising out of data breaches, there is a substantial basis in 
legal doctrine to recognize data-breach harms. These precedents involve 
other bodies of law, some closely related to the law of data breaches. Rather 
than ignoring these legal foundations for recognizing harm, courts should 
build upon them. Doing so would ensure conceptual coherence to the 
judiciary’s approach. Moreover, the existence of these other areas of law that 
recognize similar types of harm demonstrates that data-breach harms can be 
recognized without causing calamity in the law. 
A. Risk as Harm 
1. Understanding Risk.—In data-breach cases, courts have difficulty 
with the concept of risk. A problem is that fraud may not surface until after 
 
110. See Citron, State Attorneys General, supra note 58, at 748–49, 755. 
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an identity thief combines leaked personal data with other information. 
Because the downstream use of improperly obtained personal data is not 
known at the time of the breach and because it depends upon the aggregation 
of disparate sources of personal data, courts have difficulty conceptualizing 
the harm. 
What does that risk entail? It may take months or years before leaked 
personal data is abused, but when it happens, the harm can be profound. 
Identity-theft victims may face financial ruin. Identity thieves may plunder 
victims’ credit, riddling victims’ credit reports with false information 
including debts and second mortgages obtained in victims’ names. Victims 
struggling with identity theft may be forced to file for bankruptcy, and some 
may lose their homes.111 Victims may be turned down for loans or end up 
paying higher interest rates on credit cards.112 Their utilities may be cut off 
and their services denied.113 Victims’ stolen health information may be used 
to obtain medical care, saddling them with hefty hospital bills and a thief’s 
treatment records.114 Victims may incur legal fees and have to cover bounced 
checks. In 2012, the average cost of repairing identity theft was $1,769, and 
the median loss was $300.115 On average, it takes up to thirty hours to resolve 
problems when identity thieves open new accounts in victims’ names.116 To 
be sure, some types of data-breach harms are more quickly realized. 
Payment-card fraud, for example, usually occurs shortly after payment-card 
data is compromised. Because card numbers get cancelled quickly, fraudsters 
act very fast.117 
As Michael Sussmann, a lawyer in Perkins Coie’s privacy and data 
security practice, explains: “The data is sold off, and it could be a while 
before it’s used. . . . There’s often a very big delay before having a loss.”118 
Similarly, Ed Mierzwinski, the federal Consumer Program Director and 
senior fellow for U.S. PIRG, notes: 
 
111. J. Craig Anderson, Identity Theft Growing, Costly to Victims, USA TODAY (Apr. 14, 
2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2013/04/14/identity-theft-growing/ 
2082179/ [https://perma.cc/7T5Q-DTHH]. 
112. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 243779, VICTIMS OF IDENTITY THEFT, 
2012, at 7 (2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vit12.pdf [https://perma.cc/773U-SHVT]. 
113. Id. 
114. Thomas Clifford, Note, Provider Liability and Medical Identity Theft: Can I Get Your 
(Insurance) Number?, NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y, Fall 2016, at 45, 45. 
115. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., supra note 112, at 6. 
116. Id. at 10. 
117. See Andrea Peterson, Data Exposed in Breaches Can Follow People Forever. The 
Protections Offered in Their Wake Don’t., WASH. POST (June 15, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2015/06/15/data-exposed-in-breaches-can-
follow-people-forever-the-protections-offered-in-their-wake-dont/ [https://perma.cc/JBF5-4K6X] 
(explaining that card providers quickly identify and replace at-risk card numbers). 
118. Id. 
SOLOVE.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/11/2018 6:40 PM 
758 Texas Law Review [Vol. 96:737 
 
Credit card numbers and debit card numbers have a short shelf life, 
because banks figure out which cards are at risk, and people get new 
numbers without asking for them[.] Social Security [n]umbers have a 
very long shelf life—a bad guy that’s smart won’t use it immediately, 
he’ll keep a hoard of numbers and use them in a couple of years.119 
Harm may occur well beyond the statute of limitations, and the timing of the 
harm might be different for each victim. 
The problem with identity theft is that personal data cannot readily be 
“cancelled” like a credit-card number. Social Security numbers are difficult 
to change. Other personal data such as birth date and mother’s maiden name 
cannot be replaced. Biometric data such as fingerprints or eye scans, health 
information, and genetic data cannot be exchanged. A criminal may obtain a 
victim’s personal data and use it months or years later; the data will still be 
useful for committing fraud. 
Another challenge for assessing data-breach harms is the great difficulty 
in catching identity thieves. Without information about where an identity 
thief obtained the data, a plaintiff will have difficulty linking the harm to a 
particular data breach or data disclosure.120 Ironically, the very factors that 
make identity theft so harmful—the difficulty in catching the perpetrators 
and the fact that it can continue indefinitely—are what impede victims’ 
ability to obtain redress in the courts. 
What of the argument that “[a] risk of privacy harm is no more a privacy 
harm than a chance of a burn is a burn”?121 Unlike the chance of a burn while 
cooking in the kitchen, the risk of harm after a data breach inflicts harm in 
the here and now. To start, data-breach victims incur expenses to mitigate the 
damage. Data-breach victims incur out-of-pocket costs to minimize future 
losses. They purchase identity-theft-protection services and insurance to 
minimize the impact of fraud.122 Their opportunity costs are real. Individuals 
spend time monitoring their accounts, which pulls them away from their jobs. 
In cases involving privacy violations and inadequate data security, consumers 
bear the lion’s share of these costs because courts view them as too attenuated 
to recognize as harm. 
 
119. Id. 
120. Daniel J. Solove, The New Vulnerability: Data Security and Personal Information, in 
SECURING PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET AGE 111, 116 (Anupam Chander et al. eds., 2008). 
121. Calo, Boundaries, supra note 36, at 1157. 
122. See Press Release, Accenture, One in Four US Consumers Have Had Their Healthcare 
Data Breached, Accenture Survey Reveals (Feb. 20, 2017), https://newsroom.accenture 
.com/news/one-in-four-us-consumers-have-had-their-healthcare-data-breached-accenture-survey-
reveals.htm [https://perma.cc/2U3Q-HAP3] (detailing a survey of consumers which found nearly 
all data-breach victims took some type of action in response to a breach, such as purchasing 
insurance plans or subscribing to identity-protection services). 
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It is rational to spend time and money to mitigate the possibility of harm 
in the future. Insurance exists for this very purpose. There are numerous 
products and services aimed at risk mitigation. Indeed, after data breaches, 
organizations often offer affected individuals free credit monitoring.123 State 
attorneys general often insist that companies pay consumers one to two years 
of credit monitoring and identity-theft insurance after a security breach.124 
Another component of the data-breach harm involves a chilling of a 
person’s ability to engage in life’s important activities. As a result of a data 
breach, a person’s increased risk of identity theft might prevent her from 
buying a new house. Identity theft, when it occurs, pollutes a person’s credit 
report, making it difficult if not impossible to obtain a loan. In the face of a 
greater risk of identity theft, a person might be reluctant to take the steps 
necessary to buy a home, such as placing an existing home on the market, 
going house hunting, and making an offer with a deposit. Why take those 
expensive and time-consuming steps if there is a chance that her credit report 
might be damaged and thus jeopardize her deposit on a home? Why sell one’s 
current home if one would be unable to buy a new one due to a marred credit 
report? Credit reports take a long time to fix, so it is a legitimate concern that 
the person might not be able to find housing to rent while cleaning up her 
credit report, since the report is essential to obtain a rental agreement.125 
Given these significant risks, a person might delay buying a new house. 
The same concerns are true for employment. In the face of a heightened 
risk of identity theft, a person might delay looking for a new job because a 
polluted credit report can interfere with a person’s employment opportunities. 
A person might not want to go through the time and effort of applying for a 
position if there is an increased chance that future employers will find her 
credit report marred by a thief’s financial mischief. Seeking a new job could 
jeopardize one’s current employment, so a reasonable person might not 
chance losing a current job in the face of an elevated risk that it will be 
 
123. See Vincent R. Johnson, Credit-Monitoring Damages in Cybersecurity Tort Litigation, 19 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 113, 125–27 (2011) (collecting a list of several cases in which organizations 
offered free credit monitoring to affected individuals after a data breach). 
124. E.g., Press Release, Off. of the Attorney Gen., St. of Conn., AG Jepsen to Anthem: End 
Unreasonable Delay in Providing Information to Affected Residents (Feb. 10, 2015), 
http://www.ct.gov/ag/cwp/view.asp?Q=560660&A=2341 [https://perma.cc/TA46-ZWJ5] 
(demanding that Anthem inform affected consumers within 24 hours that they are going to be 
provided two years of credit monitoring and identity-theft insurance to consumers impacted by data 
breach). 
125. “Big 3” Credit Bureaus Settle with 31 States Over Credit Reporting Mistakes, 
CONSUMERS UNION (May 26, 2015), http://consumersunion.org/2015/05/big-3-credit-bureaus-
settle-with-31-states-over-credit-reporting-mistakes/ [https://perma.cc/EEV6-7G7G] (explaining 
that one in five consumers have an error in their credit reports). 
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difficult to obtain a new one. Then too, a person might be chilled from 
seeking a job that requires a security clearance.126 
Just as people might rationally delay an outdoor party when the forecast 
calls for a greater chance of rain, people might delay certain important life 
decisions when their risk of a sullied credit report increases. 
Although the increased risk of harm as a result of a data breach might 
be hard to see, consider the following analogy. Imagine that a person owns 
two identical safes. She wants to sell them and lists them on eBay: 
SAFE FOR SALE 
Made of the thickest iron with the most unbreakable lock. 
 
 
 
SAFE FOR SALE 
Made of the thickest iron with the most unbreakable lock. However, 
the combination to the safe was improperly disclosed and others may 
know it. Unfortunately, the safe’s combination cannot be reset. 
Which safe would get the higher price? 
Safe 2 is no longer as good as Safe 1. Its utility has been damaged by 
the improper disclosure of the combination to the safe, and thus the value of 
the safe has been significantly reduced. 
Or suppose there is a new virus that does not cause adverse effects but 
that makes people more vulnerable to getting a painful disease later on. Many 
people will not develop the painful disease—only some will fall prey to it. 
Nonetheless, those with the virus are at greater risk to develop the painful 
disease. Has the person who has contracted the virus suffered harm? 
In the case of the safe combination and the virus, people are made more 
vulnerable: they are placed in a weakened and more precarious position. 
Their risk level has increased. They are worse off than before the release of 
a safe’s combination number or the exposure to a virus. In the immediate 
present, the increased risk exposure is undesirable, anxiety producing, and 
frustrating. In cases involving an increased risk of future harm, not all 
individuals will actually suffer that harm, but “each has suffered a loss in an 
actuarial sense because his chances of avoiding the harm have been 
reduced.”127 
 
126. Although Calo’s scholarship has rejected the notion of risk as cognizable harm, the related 
out-of-pocket expenses and opportunity costs might fall under an expanded understanding of his 
view of objective harm. 
127. David A. Fischer, Tort Recovery for Loss of a Chance, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 605, 
633 (2001). See Zehner v. Post Oak Oil Co., 640 P.2d 991, 994–95 (Okla. Civ. App. 1981) (allowing 
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People have a meaningful interest in avoiding risk.128 They will go to 
the doctor to monitor their health. They will pay for insurance to insure 
against particular risks. Indeed, the insurance market is proof that protection 
against risk has a monetary value. 
Although there are sophisticated ways to assess and understand risk, 
many courts have refused to recognize risk as a cognizable harm in data-
breach cases. Risk is a central concept toward making more intelligent and 
practical decisions. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously observed, 
“the man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of economics.”129 
And in many areas, law has recognized risk as a legally cognizable harm. 
2. Legal Foundations for Recognizing Risk as a Cognizable Harm.—
Data-breach harms may push on the edges of the law, but ample foundations 
and significant flexibility exist in the law to recognize them. The law has 
evolved to recognize risk. This trend is likely driven by the fact that modern 
thinking in science and business, among other domains, is deeply focused on 
risk. Because the conceptual underpinnings for recognizing data-breach 
harms are already present in the law, recognizing such harms does not require 
a radical shift in legal conceptions of harm. Risk so pervades modern thinking 
that law cannot resist embracing the concept if it is to remain relevant. 
The law has grown in its recognition of future injury.130 Over time, 
probabilistic injuries have been recognized in three conceptually related 
areas: increased risk of injury, loss of a chance, and fear of disease.131 Tort 
law has developed to recognize the “fear of or the increased risk of 
developing a disease in the future” and “lost chances to avoid diseases or 
physical injury” as compensable injuries.132 For these claims, the harm is the 
destruction of a future opportunity and the loss of hope.133 
Courts have begun allowing people to sue for medical malpractice that 
results in the loss of an “opportunity to obtain a better degree of recovery.”134 
Under risk-of-future-harm cases, damages include those “directly resulting 
 
tort recovery as compensation for a lost chance to obtain a lease of land at a particularly profitable 
rate when the defendant committed the tort of slander of title). 
128. Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136, 181 (1992). 
129. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 187 
(1920). 
130. Levit, supra note 128, at 154–55. 
131. Id. at 154. 
132. Id. at 154–55. 
133. Id. at 158. 
134. E.g., Lord v. Lovett, 770 A.2d 1103, 1104–06 (N.H. 2001) (holding a medical malpractice 
plaintiff could recover for a lost chance at full recovery under the loss-of-opportunity doctrine); see 
Claire Finkelstein, Is Risk a Harm?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 963, 985–86 (2003) (arguing tort law 
supports the notion of risk as a harm, and citing as a specific example lost-chance-of-recovery cases 
where medical malpractice plaintiffs are compensated for reduced chance of medical cure). 
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from the loss of a chance of achieving a more favorable outcome,” as well as 
damages “for the mental distress from the realization that the patient’s 
prospects of avoiding adverse past or future harm were tortiously destroyed 
or reduced,” and damages “for the medical costs of monitoring the condition 
in order to detect and respond to a recurrence or complications.”135 For 
example, in Petriello v. Kalman,136 a physician made an error that damaged 
the plaintiff’s intestines.137 The plaintiff was estimated to have between an 
8% and 16% chance that she would suffer a future bowel obstruction.138 The 
court concluded that the plaintiff should be compensated for the increased 
risk of developing the bowel obstruction “to the extent that the future harm 
is likely to occur.”139 
Similarly, environmental law is premised on the notion of risk as harm. 
“One of the major innovations of environmental law has been to substitute 
the concept of risk as a proxy for injury for the common law’s insistence that 
injury be established by proof that an action in fact caused demonstrable 
harm.”140 Courts have found increased risk of disease sufficient for standing 
purposes and as the basis of regulation.141 
To be sure, if remedies for increased risk of injury were applied broadly, 
many kinds of vulnerabilities would be prohibited. A driver who operates his 
car recklessly increases other drivers’ potential to get into an accident. It 
would be difficult to imagine the law recognizing increased risk as harm due 
to reckless driving. In other cases, however, the law provides a remedy for 
increased risk of developing health complications due to medical 
malpractice. Why the different result? Once the reckless driver passes by 
traffic without getting into an accident, the risk has been eliminated. By 
contrast, the risk of developing future complications from medical 
malpractice may have no clear end in sight. 
The risk of injury in a data-breach case is closer to the medical-
malpractice scenario than that of the reckless driver. To the individuals whose 
personal data is leaked into the hands of thieves, the risk of harm is 
continuing. Hackers may not use the personal data in the near term to steal 
 
135. Joseph H. King, Jr., “Reduction of Likelihood” Reformulation and Other Retrofitting of 
the Loss-of-a-Chance Doctrine, 28 U. MEM. L. REV. 491, 504–05 (1998). 
136. 576 A.2d 474 (Conn. 1990). 
137. Id. at 476. 
138. Id. at 477. 
139. Id. at 484. 
140. ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 738 
(5th ed. 2007). 
141. E.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., 438 U.S. 59, 74, 81 (1978) (holding 
the chance of “health and genetic” consequences resulting from exposure to radiation were 
sufficient to satisfy standing’s injury-in-fact requirement); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 1, 12, 
17 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding that the Clean Air Act empowers the EPA to regulate prophylactically 
against the risk of harm). 
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bank accounts and take out loans. Instead, they may wait until an illness 
befalls a family member and then use personal data to generate medical bills 
in a victim’s name. They may use the personal data a year later but only use 
some individuals’ personal information for fraud. Although not all of the 
personal data will be used for criminal ends, some will. In the meanwhile, the 
individuals worry that their information will be misused and expend time and 
resources to protect themselves from this possibility. 
Long-term risk is not a harmless wrong, unlike the risky driver who does 
not hurt anyone. It is not negligence “in the air,” which the law has long 
understood as unworthy of a legal response.142 There is an injury; it is not a 
regrettable close call like the reckless driver who hits no one. When an entity 
inadequately secures personal data and thieves steal it, the entity’s 
unreasonable actions impact a sizeable number of users, often in the 
millions,143 and the excess risk of fraud is certain to take its toll on a number 
of those users. Victims spend time and money to minimize the impact of 
identity theft. They refrain from important life opportunities, such as buying 
a new home or looking for a new job. Over time, the risk of identity theft will 
materialize for a percentage of those users. Although the eventual victims 
cannot be immediately identified, the entity cannot deny the reality of the 
loss it has inflicted. 
Law’s recognition of risk of future harm was arguably anticipated by 
the Court in Robins v. Spokeo when the Court noted that intangible 
informational injuries, recognized at common law, can provide the basis for 
harm sufficient to support standing.144 As shown by judicial doctrine related 
to lost chances, the common law has come to recognize increased risk of 
harm as an intangible injury worthy of redress. 
There are practical implications of denying increased risk as a 
cognizable harm in data-breach cases. If increased risk is not understood as 
harm, then when the risk materializes, such as when the identity theft occurs, 
plaintiffs probably will be unable to sue at all. Statutes of limitations would 
likely bar any lawsuit.145 Even if statutes of limitations are not a bar, delay in 
resolving the issue may lead to the loss of evidence. 
 
142. See David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” 
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 883 (1984) (explaining, in the mass exposure 
toxic tort setting, that torts creating long-term risk in a large enough group will inevitably manifest 
real injury, meaning the tortfeasor’s wrongful conduct cannot be forgiven as “negligence in the 
air”). 
143. See, e.g., Off. of the Att’y Gen., St. of Conn., supra note 124 (stating that the Anthem data 
breach “may have exposed sensitive personal information of as many as 80 million people, or 
perhaps more”). 
144. See supra notes 28–34 and accompanying text (discussing Spokeo). 
145. Daniel Bugni, Standing Together: An Analysis of the Injury Requirement in Data Breach 
Class Actions, 52 GONZ. L. REV. 59, 89 (2016). 
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In many other contexts, high-stakes decisions are based on risk, a fact 
that makes it difficult to understand why law should be an exception. Legal 
decisions are not necessarily more important than decisions in other domains; 
nor are people in the law inherently less capable of comprehending risk. 
Despite the law’s caution and timidity with risk, it has been making 
significant steps toward embracing risk concepts. Risk-oriented harm has 
increasingly been recognized by the law, which has been catching up to more 
modern understandings of risk management. Changes in risk level have 
significant financial repercussions, and there are concrete and sophisticated 
approaches to evaluating, monetizing, and managing risk. Thus, the 
foundation is present for a more robust understanding of data-breach harm. 
B. Anxiety as Harm 
1. Understanding Anxiety.—Data-breach harms often result in victims 
experiencing anxiety about the increased risk of future harm. Anxiety is a 
form of emotional distress, which is an umbrella term to capture a wide array 
of negative and disruptive feelings such as sadness, embarrassment, and 
anxiety, among others.146 With a data breach, anxiety is experienced as a 
result of knowing that personal information, often sensitive, can be observed 
and used to one’s detriment.147 Emotional distress is experienced in the 
present, but courts are reluctant to recognize it as a cognizable injury arising 
out of data-breach harms. 
For breaches involving embarrassing or reputation-damaging 
information, plaintiffs clearly suffer emotional distress. Consider the breach 
of the Ashley Madison website, an online hub for individuals seeking sexual 
encounters outside of their relationships.148 The hackers stole information 
related to users’ sexual desires and personally identifying information and 
posted it online.149 The knowledge that employers, family, and friends might 
discover one’s intimate desires and fantasies produced significant anxiety.150 
 
146. 2 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 302 (2001). 
147. Calo, Boundaries, supra note 36, at 1148. As Calo argues and as we agree, there is real 
harm in the anxiety someone suffers due to the unwanted observation of personal information, such 
as the emotional distress suffered from knowing embarrassing information is lingering online or 
that a data breach could lead to identity theft. See id. at 1148–49 (describing the privacy harm that 
occurs where an individual worries observation could lead to the unanticipated use of personal 
information that will lead to “some adverse, real-world consequence”). 
148. Lisa Bonos, Ashley Madison’s Data Breach is a Warning for Us All, Cheaters or Not, 
WASH. POST (July 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/soloish/wp/2015/07/20/ 
ashley-madisons-data-breach-is-a-warning-for-all-of-us-cheaters-or-not/ [https://perma.cc/6R6L-
JTGM]. 
149. Id. 
150. See Troy Hunt, Here’s What Ashley Madison Members Have Told Me, TROY HUNT BLOG 
(Aug. 24, 2015), https://www.troyhunt.com/heres-what-ashley-madison-members-have/ [https:// 
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Ashley Madison users who were active members of the military worried that 
they might face penalties because adultery is a punishable offense under the 
Army’s Military Code of Conduct.151 Following the breach, several affected 
individuals committed suicide.152  
Many data breaches, however, do not involve embarrassing or 
discrediting information. The exposure of this information might not seem as 
intuitively harmful, but anxiety can be caused in many ways. Personal data 
involved in a breach is often a tool used for financial or identity fraud, and 
living under the specter of such fraud can make reasonable people worry that, 
at any moment, they might be impeded in making financial transactions, 
obtaining employment, or engaging in many other important activities. 
A concern with recognizing emotional distress in data-breach cases is 
that psychic distress can be readily manufactured. Arguments against the 
recognition of anxiety focus on the fact that claims of anxiety are easy to 
make and difficult to dispute. Plaintiffs will quickly learn to make poignant 
statements about their anguish with details exaggerating their distress. 
Defendants may have difficulty disproving plaintiffs’ accounts of their own 
subjective mental states. 
Concerns over disingenuous claims of emotional distress as well as the 
difficulty in disproving such claims are certainly significant. But as we 
demonstrate in the next Part, the law has evolved to recognize emotional 
distress disconnected from physical or financial injury. In certain privacy 
cases, courts recognize pure emotional distress without hesitation,153 most 
likely, we posit, because courts recognize that most people would feel 
emotional distress in these situations. In essence, an unstated objective test to 
emotional distress seems to exist in privacy tort cases. 
Many other areas of law involve proving subjective mental states. 
Indeed, the vast majority of criminal law involves subjective mental states 
that must be proven with the highest standard of proof—beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Despite the challenges, the law quite often involves a quest to delve 
into the truth of what was going on in a person’s mind. 
 
perma.cc/3M24-9TJX] (detailing numerous anxious and worried reactions by Ashley Madison 
members after the breach). 
151. Woodrow Hartzog & Danielle Citron, Five Unexpected Lessons from the Ashley Madison 
Breach, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 29, 2016), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/12/op-ed-five-
unexpected-lessons-from-the-ashley-madison-breach/ [https://perma.cc/VK3W-UF34]. 
152. John Gibson, a pastor, took his own life six days after his name was released in the leak. 
His suicide note talked about his regret in using the site. Id. A San Antonio, Texas police captain 
committed suicide shortly after his email address was linked to an Ashley Madison account. Id. 
153. See, e.g., Doe v. Hofstetter, No. 11–cv–02209–DME–MJW, 2012 WL 2319052, at *8 
(D. Colo. June 13, 2012) (awarding a plaintiff damages for alleged “severe emotional distress” in a 
default judgment without question); Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So.2d 474, 475–76, 478 
(Ala. 1964) (affirming damages for a plaintiff who suffered embarrassment after defendant 
published a photo of plaintiff with her undergarments exposed). 
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A data breach can quite appropriately result in victims feeling anxiety. 
Leaks of personal data can cause embarrassment or result in fraudulent 
transactions. The most common preventative measure given to people is 
credit monitoring,154 but this cannot inoculate data-breach victims against 
future injury. Credit monitoring merely informs people about anomalies in 
their credit reports after theft has occurred.155 It does not prevent the misuse 
of data. By analogy, credit monitoring is akin to a blood-screening test for 
cancer. The test might indicate that a person has cancer, but the test is not a 
cure. Nor does routinely testing a person for cancer address the emotional 
suffering as a result of a person’s increased risk of developing cancer. 
Credit monitoring cannot totally alleviate a person’s anxiety. Although 
credit monitoring will detect fraud appearing on a person’s credit report, not 
all fraud will be documented in a victim’s credit report. Fraudulent uses of 
leaked personal data that do not involve credit will often not be reported on 
a credit report. A credit report, for instance, will not alert a data-breach victim 
that a thief used her leaked personal information to empty her bank 
accounts.156 It will not notify a data-breach victim that a fraudster has used 
her leaked login credentials to access private files on her computer or used 
her computer to send out spam.157 
Data breaches can create a cascade of compromised accounts, especially 
if they involve personal data about password-recovery questions. Because 
there is no ready expiration date on the misuse of compromised personal data, 
criminals can at any point use that information to defraud victims. Anxiety 
about this increased risk, which often cannot be fully reduced, is a legitimate, 
real, and discomfiting experience. 
Anxiety over a data breach is often dismissed as the irrational response 
of abnormally anxious people. But it is rational for people to feel anxiety 
about the fact that their personal data is in the hands of criminals who can 
cause their financial ruin. A blizzard of laws protects data security, the reality 
of which demonstrates that data breaches are not a trivial matter to 
 
154. See, e.g., Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 663 F. App’x 384, 386 (6th Cir. 2016) (noting 
that in response to a breach of its computer networks, the defendant offered free credit monitoring 
to its customers); Press Release, Equifax, Inc., Equifax Releases Details on Cybersecurity Incident, 
Announces Personnel Changes (Sept. 15, 2017), https://investor.equifax.com/news-and-
events/news/2017/09-15-2017-224018832 [https://perma.cc/U2CE-KQJR] (highlighting that in 
response to a data breach, Equifax offered free credit monitoring to all of its customers). 
155. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-254, IDENTITY THEFT SERVICES: 
SERVICES OFFER SOME BENEFITS BUT ARE LIMITED IN PREVENTING FRAUD 10 (2017). 
156. Identity Theft Protection Services, FED. TRADE COMM’N: CONSUMER INFO. (Mar. 2016), 
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0235-identity-theft-protection-services#monitoring 
[https://perma.cc/X779-MMT3]. 
157. See id. (“Credit monitoring only warns you about activity that shows up on your credit 
report.”). 
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legislatures. The media often report on data breaches,158 and it is rational to 
assume that the media is paying attention because data breaches cause some 
kind of harm. Otherwise, why report on something that should generate no 
worries or concerns? 
People are often advised to take steps to protect their personal data, such 
as Social Security numbers.159 They are told to shred documents with 
sensitive personal data and to avoid carrying such data around in their 
wallets.160 Rational people would assume that these measures are meant to 
prevent something harmful from happening. Otherwise, why bother if there 
is nothing to worry about? It seems reasonable for a person to respond to a 
data breach with anxiety in light of all the attention and concern given to data 
breaches. So much focus is not typically given to something that is benign. 
Moreover, many organizations stress that keeping personal data secure is 
very important to them.161 If failing to do so should not cause people any 
anxiety, then why bother promising to keep the data secure? It would be 
absurd for organizations to worry about data breaches if victims have nothing 
to be concerned about. 
2. Legal Foundations for Recognizing Anxiety as Harm.—Ample 
foundations exist in the law to recognize anxiety as a cognizable harm. There 
was a time when pure emotional distress was discounted because it seemed 
 
158. See, e.g., Tara Siegel Bernard et al., Equifax Says Cyberattack May Have Affected 143 
Million in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/ 
business/equifax-cyberattack.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-
heading&module=first-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news [https://perma.cc/ 
D9E6-BXGW] (discussing the 2017 Equifax cyberattack that resulted in a breach of sensitive 
consumer information); Rishi Iyengar, Hackers Release Data from Cheating Website Ashley 
Madison Online, TIME (Aug. 18, 2015), http://time.com/4002647/ashley-madison-hackers-data-
released-impact-team/?iid=sr-link1 [https://perma.cc/37Y3-WHAP] (detailing the 2015 data breach 
of Ashley Madison that revealed members’ personal and financial data); Maggie McGrath, Target 
Data Breach Spilled Info On As Many As 70 Million Customers, FORBES (Jan. 10, 2014), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/maggiemcgrath/2014/01/10/target-data-breach-spilled-info-on-as-
many-as-70-million-customers/#528bf61ee795 [https://perma.cc/XQ6V-GUSK] (reporting on the 
breach of customer information at Target in late 2013). 
159. See How to Keep Your Personal Information Secure, FED. TRADE COMM’N: CONSUMER 
INFO. (July 2012), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0272-how-keep-your-personal-
information-secure [https://perma.cc/H7QF-JZN3] (detailing suggestions for protecting personal 
information to avoid identity theft). 
160. Id. 
161. See, e.g., AMAZON WEB SERVS., AMAZON WEB SERVICES: OVERVIEW OF SECURITY 
PROCESSES 1 (2017), https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/Security/AWS_Security_ 
Whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/8KR8-QQFT] (“Helping to protect the confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability of our customers’ systems and data is of the utmost importance . . . .”); This Is How 
We Protect Your Privacy, APPLE INC., https://www.apple.com/privacy/approach-to-privacy/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZQC8-4B8H] (“We’re committed to keeping your personal information safe.”). 
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too ethereal, too difficult to measure, too easy to fake.162 That view of 
emotional distress faded in the mid-twentieth century.163 It has been replaced 
by a much greater and growing acceptance of emotional distress as a 
cognizable harm. 
The law has grown to recognize so-called “ethereal” harms.164 In some 
instances, the recognition of emotional distress traces its roots back before 
the modern era. As Ryan Calo has argued, the “tort of assault—where the 
harm is the emotion of fear—dates back six and a half centuries.”165 It 
redressed emotional distress without any showing of physical injury.166 
Relational torts like the alienation of affection, of a similar vintage, permitted 
compensation for emotional distress.167 
Privacy law’s roots supported the recognition of emotional distress as a 
compensable injury in the early twentieth century. In The Right to Privacy,168 
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis spent considerable energy discussing the 
evolving nature of harm, from tangible to intangible injuries. “[I]n very early 
times,” they contended, “the law gave a remedy only for physical interference 
with life and property.”169 Subsequently, the law expanded to recognize 
incorporeal injuries; “[f]rom the action of battery grew that of assault. Much 
later there came a qualified protection of the individual against offensive 
noises and odors, against dust and smoke, and excessive vibration. The law 
of nuisance was developed.”170 Property developed to include “every form of 
 
162. See Levit, supra note 128, at 172 (arguing that courts effectively exercise “a presumption 
that claims of mental disturbance are frivolous”); Leslie Benton Sandor & Carol Berry, Recovery 
for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Attendant to Economic Loss: A Reassessment, 37 
ARIZ. L. REV. 1247, 1253 (1995) (exploring fears about triviality, fraudulent claims, and 
unmanageability that accompany resistance to emotional distress torts). Emotional distress was also 
dismissed as the province of the neurotic, weak-minded, and deviant. See Rodrigues v. State, 472 
P.2d 509, 520 (Haw. 1970) (addressing the argument that “mental distress of a trivial and transient 
nature are part and parcel of everyday life” and that the law should not “curry to neurotic patterns 
in the population”); Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender 
Harassment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 373, 393 (2009) (describing the persistent historical trivialization 
of women’s emotional distress and dismissal of attendant tort claims). Amanda Pustilnik 
insightfully explores the law’s tendency to refuse damages for pain and suffering because plaintiffs 
were viewed as mentally ill, hysterical, or fraudsters. A.C. Pustilnik, Imaging Brains, Changing 
Minds: How Pain Neuroimaging Can Inform the Law, 66 ALA. L. REV. 1099, 1107–12 (2015). 
163. See Robert L. Rabin, Emotional Distress in Tort Law: Themes of Constraint, 44 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1197, 1197 (2009) (explaining that emotional distress “gained respectability” as a 
stand-alone tort claim with the adoption of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress 
into the Restatement (Second) of Torts in 1948 and 1960 respectively). 
164. Levit, supra note 128, at 158. 
165. Calo, Exceptionalism, supra note 35, at 363. 
166. Rabin, supra note 163, at 1197. 
167. Id. 
168. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 
(1890). 
169. Id. 
170. Id. at 194. 
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possession—intangible, as well as tangible.”171 Defamation law protected 
reputations without requiring proof of financial or physical suffering. The 
harm involved a person’s good name rather than a tangible loss.172 
In tracing law’s development surrounding the nature of harm, Warren 
and Brandeis were paving the way for the legal recognition of remedies for 
privacy invasions, which primarily involve an “injury to the feelings.”173 
Warren and Brandeis identified the legally protected interest set back by 
privacy invasions as a person’s ability to develop her “inviolate” 
personality.174 Privacy invasions inflict harm by interfering with a person’s 
ability to decide the extent to which her personal information would be 
revealed, shared, and disclosed to others. Warren and Brandeis noted that 
privacy invasions interfere with a person’s “estimate of himself,” inflicting 
“mental pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily 
injury.”175 
In the century following the publication of the Warren and Brandeis 
article, the law grew to recognize privacy torts because emotional tranquility 
was an interest deserving protection.176 Courts recognized that emotional 
distress could be “as severe and debilitating as physical harm.”177 Privacy tort 
claims have succeeded in garnering compensation for emotional distress.178 
Plaintiffs have prevailed in cases involving the dissemination of nude 
photos,179 before-and-after photos of plastic-surgery patients,180 and autopsy 
 
171. Id. at 193. 
172. Id. at 197. Defamation liability includes redress for emotional distress caused by the 
defamatory publication. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
173. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 168, at 197. 
174. Id. at 205, 211. 
175. Id. at 196–97. 
176. See Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. 
L. REV. 1033, 1035–36 (1936) (explaining that most jurisdictions had begun to allow recovery for 
outrage and emotional distress, abandoning the common law view that peace of mind is not worthy 
of legal protection). 
177. E.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 814 (Cal. 1980); Schultz v. Barberton 
Glass Co., 447 N.E.2d 109, 113 (Ohio 1983) (citing Molien). 
178. See Citron, Mainstreaming, supra note 36, at 1811–14 (2010) (exploring privacy tort cases 
awarding damages for emotional distress, mental anguish, worry, and embarrassment). 
179. Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So.2d 474, 475–76, 478 (Ala. 1964) (awarding 
damages for embarrassment and humiliation after a newspaper published a picture of the plaintiff 
whose undergarments were exposed after wind blew up her skirt); Doe v. Hofstetter, No. 11-cv-
02209-DME-MJW, 2012 WL 2319052, at *7 (D. Colo. June 13, 2012) (awarding, in a default 
judgment, damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress and public disclosure of private 
fact where the complaint alleged the defendant had posted intimate photographs of the plaintiff 
online, emailed them to plaintiff’s husband, and created fake Twitter accounts displaying them). 
180. Vassiliades v. Garfinckel’s, Brooks Bros., Miller & Rhoades, Inc., 492 A.2d 580, 585–86, 
594–95 (D.C. 1985). 
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or death-scene photos of loved ones.181 Courts do not question the harm in 
those cases, even though it involves intangible injury.182 Indeed, with corpse 
photos, courts recognize that the photos implicate the privacy rights not of 
the subject of the photos (the dead person) but of the deceased person’s 
family members.183 
The privacy torts readily allow for emotional distress damages alone. As 
David Elder aptly notes in his treatise Privacy Torts, decisions on the public-
disclosure-of-private-fact tort “collectively reject any suggestion that special 
damages or physical injuries are a threshold pre-condition to recovery.”184 
Elder explains that courts have permitted harms such as “injury to feelings or 
sensibilities; feelings of violation and mortification; . . . fear for physical 
security; . . . past and future humiliation; [and] embarrassment,” among other 
things.185 According to the Restatement of Torts, plaintiffs can recover for 
purely emotional distress harm.186 As one court put it, plaintiffs are “entitled 
to recover substantial damages, although the only damages suffered . . . 
resulted from mental anguish.”187 
Under the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, mental distress is 
“recoverable without the necessity of showing actual physical injury . . . 
because the injury is essentially . . . subjective, not actual harm done to the 
plaintiff’s body.”188 As a court noted: “The difficulty of measuring damages 
for invasion of privacy is no reason for denying relief.”189 Elder observes that  
Since the gravamen of the tort is “injury to the feelings of the plaintiff, 
and the mental anguish and distress caused thereby,” the plaintiff is 
generally entitled to collect substantial damages, “damages of real 
 
181. Catsouras v. Dep’t of the Cal. Highway Patrol, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352, 359, 385 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2010) (concerning automobile death scene photos); Douglas v. Stokes, 149 S.W. 849, 849–50 
(Ky. 1912) (concerning autopsy photos of conjoined twins). A family’s privacy interest in death 
images of deceased persons was also recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court as a valid basis to assert 
a privacy exemption to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). See Nat’l Archives & Records 
Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 168, 174–75 (2004) (“Family members have a personal stake in 
honoring and mourning their dead and objecting to unwarranted public exploitation that, by 
intruding upon their own grief, tends to degrade the rites and respect they seek to accord to the 
deceased person who was once their own.”). 
182. See Citron, Mainstreaming, supra note 36, at 1811–14 (noting courts’ recognition of 
mental and privacy harms across a variety of privacy torts). 
183. See Catsouras, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 394 (concluding that the plaintiffs had a privacy 
interest in preventing the dissemination of gruesome photographs of their deceased loved one); 
Stokes, 149 S.W. at 849–50 (affirming that the defendant–photographer violated the plaintiff’s 
privacy when he wrongfully used photographs of the plaintiff’s dead children for his own benefit). 
184. ELDER, supra note 47, at § 3:8. 
185. Id. 
186. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652H cmt. b (AM. LAW. INST. 1977). 
187. Brents v. Morgan, 299 S.W. 967, 971 (Ky. 1927). 
188. Gonzales v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 555 S.W.2d 219, 221–22 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 
1977) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858, 861 (Tex. 1973)). 
189. Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen., 642 F. Supp. 1357, 1422 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
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worth and importance,” for emotional distress without any proof of 
special damages or physical or otherwise debilitating psychic 
injury.190 
Courts have also recognized emotional harm for the breach-of-
confidentiality tort. The law recognizes that disclosures of information made 
in confidential relationships involve “harms of broken trust, betrayal, and 
disrupted expectations of secrecy.”191 Suppose a doctor improperly breaches 
patient confidentiality and reveals the patient’s medical data to another 
person. The data is not embarrassing; the patient is in good health, and there 
is nothing embarrassing revealed and no reputational damage done. Is the 
patient harmed? Courts readily recognize harm under these circumstances. 
The harm involves the betrayal of trust in socially desirable professional 
relationships. As Elder notes, “The permissible damages are broad and 
parallel those available under the intrusion and other privacy torts.”192 
Additionally, in other contexts, courts accept emotional distress damages 
based solely upon the plaintiff’s testimony, such as in employment-
discrimination cases.193 
In case after case involving the privacy torts and breach-of-
confidentiality tort, courts have recognized harm based on pure emotional 
distress or psychological impairment. Fear, anxiety, embarrassment, and loss 
of trust are all recognized as harms.194 Humiliation, nervousness, worry, and 
loss of sleep are understood as compensable harms.195 
The inconsistency between these different contexts is quite stark. Bodies 
of tort jurisprudence are entirely ignored in cases involving data-breach 
harms. Courts do not distinguish these cases; they simply do not mention 
them, as if those cases did not exist as precedent. Hardly any attempt is made 
to reconcile them. In contrast to cases involving data breaches, cases 
involving the privacy torts and breach-of-confidentiality tort lack the judicial 
hand-wringing and angst over the recognition of emotional harm. 
The common law has also recognized claims for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress as well as for negligent infliction of emotional distress.196 
Claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress initially were limited to 
 
190. ELDER, supra note 47, § 2:10. 
191. Levit, supra note 128, at 147–48. 
192. ELDER, supra note 47, at § 5:2. 
193. Lewis R. Hagood, Claims of Mental and Emotional Damages in Employment 
Discrimination Cases, 29 U. MEM. L. REV. 577, 586 (1999) (“[A] majority of the federal courts that 
have held a plaintiff’s own testimony as sufficient to sustain an award of damages for emotional 
distress usually subject such claims to heightened scrutiny.”). 
194. See Citron, Mainstreaming, supra note 36, at 1811–14 (offering examples of mental 
injuries resulting from privacy intrusions). 
195. Id. at 1811. 
196. Keating, supra note 54, at 277 & n.18. 
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cases involving physical injury, but that rule eased over time.197 In the past 
fifty years, courts have deemphasized the “directness of the physical injury” 
and emphasized the “reality of the emotional distress suffered by the 
plaintiff.”198 Courts have recognized negligent-infliction-of-emotional-
distress claims where the emotional distress occurs in the context of 
relationships that impose independent, preexisting duties of care.199 
Relevant to data-breach cases, in a series of cases, courts have permitted 
emotional distress damages for fear of contracting diseases. Courts have held 
that plaintiffs can recover for fear of contracting AIDS, even if they do not 
yet have AIDS and even if they are not HIV positive.200 For example, in 
Johnson v. West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc.,201 the court held that a 
police officer could sue for emotional distress caused by the fear of 
contracting AIDS after being bitten by an AIDS patient.202 Although a 
majority of courts require plaintiffs to prove actual exposure to HIV,203 a 
number of courts do not require exposure to HIV to warrant recovery for 
emotional distress.204 Courts have also permitted emotional distress damages 
based on fear of contracting cancer. In one case, a court held that the 
 
197. See Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 
722, 814–15 (1985) (describing the tests of varying stringency courts have applied to emotional 
distress claims). 
198. Levit, supra note 28, at 144. 
199. Keating, supra note 54, at 278. 
200. Vance A. Fink, Jr., Emotional Distress Damages for Fear of Contracting AIDS: Should 
Plaintiffs Have to Show Exposure to HIV?, 99 DICK. L. REV. 779, 794 (1995); James C. Maroulis, 
Note, Can HIV-Negative Plaintiffs Recover Emotional Distress Damages for Their Fear of AIDS?, 
62 FORDHAM L. REV. 225, 237–39, 247 (1993). 
201. 413 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1991). 
202. Id. at 891, 894. 
203. Majca v. Beekil, 701 N.E.2d 1084, 1089 (Ill. 1998) (“[A] majority of the courts that have 
considered claims for fear of contracting AIDS have required a showing of actual exposure to 
HIV.”). Some of the cases cited in Majca include: Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355 (Del. 1995); 
K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. 1995); Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618 (Tenn. 1997); 
Johnson v. West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889 (1991); and Neal v. Neal, 873 
P.2d 871 (1994). Majca, 701 N.E.2d at 1089. 
204. See Hartwig v. Or. Trail Eye Clinic, 580 N.W.2d 86, 94 (Neb. 1998) (allowing plaintiffs 
to recover for mental anguish even when it cannot be determined whether the tissue, blood, or body 
fluid may be HIV positive); Williamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14, 21–22 (N.J. 1997) (rejecting the 
actual-exposure requirement and allowing emotional distress damage for plaintiffs who could show 
genuine, reasonable emotional distress); Madrid v. Lincoln Cty. Med. Ctr., 923 P.2d 1154, 1160–
61, 1163 (N.M. 1996) (holding an emotional distress plaintiff must only prove contact with a 
channel medically capable of transmitting HIV, regardless of whether HIV was present at the time 
of contact); Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 337 (Md. 1993) (holding plaintiffs can recover for fear 
of contracting AIDS when the fear is during the reasonable window of anxiety); see also Marchica 
v. Long Island R.R. Co., 31 F.3d 1197, 1206–07 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that despite medical 
uncertainty as to how the HIV virus could be transmitted through a needle, plaintiff’s contact with 
an HIV-positive needle was sufficient to support a fear-of-developing-disease claim). 
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plaintiff’s fear of getting cancer after being exposed to asbestos was 
reasonable and actionable.205 
The harm from an increased risk of identity theft is akin to the risk of 
contracting a chronic disease. The risk of a data breach is ongoing. Data-
breach notification letters explicitly inform people that there is a risk of 
identity theft. Credit-monitoring services are offered for one or two years,206 
signaling to plaintiffs an increased risk of theft for that time period. When a 
person has a reasonable belief that her credit identity is in jeopardy, she is 
rightly afraid that her creditworthiness is out of her hands. The exposure to 
the risk of identity theft can be anxiety-inducing because identity theft can 
have catastrophic effects on an individual’s life and because it is difficult to 
resolve. The passage of time may not dissipate that fear because identity theft 
can happen at any time. A person’s financial and employment opportunities 
can be destroyed by identity theft, and time and money are essential to 
addressing it. In all of these ways, identity theft is the digital equivalent to 
contracting a chronic disease. 
The clear direction and thrust of the law is towards a greater recognition 
of emotional distress. In various contexts, the law has increasingly 
recognized pure emotional distress as cognizable harm. Negligent infliction 
of emotional distress has moved beyond the narrow confines of physical 
harm to extend to certain relationships requiring a duty of care.207 These 
bodies of law have laid the foundation to extend emotional distress damages 
to cases involving inadequate security.208 
Thus, there is a robust basis in the law to recognize the intangible nature 
of data-breach harms. In tort cases, courts have recognized emotional distress 
 
205. Devlin v. Johns–Manville Corp., 495 A.2d 495, 498–99 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985). 
206. See Robert Harrow, What For-Pay Credit Monitoring Services Actually Offer, FORBES 
(Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertharrow/2017/09/25/what-for-pay-credit-
monitoring-services-actually-offer/#62a9303579bc [https://perma.cc/Z5Y3-ELPD] (explaining 
that Equifax has offered a one-year credit-monitoring service); How FDIC Is Helping, FDIC 
(Nov. 1, 2016), https://www.fdic.gov/creditmonitoring/howfdicishelping.html [https://perma 
.cc/W4GK-UQL9] (offering a two-year credit-monitoring service for individuals affected by FDIC 
security incidents). 
207. The Reporters’ Memorandum to tentative drafts of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm explains that there is a “recurring (and new) theme”—
the use of “arbitrary lines to limit recovery for emotional disturbance.” Reporters’ Memorandum to 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM xxi (AM. 
LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007). The Reporters’ Memorandum recognizes that the 
restrictions are arbitrary but that “given the ubiquity of emotional disturbance, lines must be drawn.” 
Id. 
208. For further discussion on how the foundation of tort law can be adopted to modern cyber-
security issues, see generally Citron, Mainstreaming, supra note 35 (detailing the foundation created 
from existing privacy tort law and suggesting how to adapt existing tort law to fit modern cyber 
issues); Citron, Reservoirs, supra note 35 (analyzing the use of tort law to combat the current cyber 
crisis and offering suggestions for how the law should adapt to meet the changing challenges of the 
Information Age). 
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alone as sufficient for harm. These cases typically involve privacy torts and 
breach of confidentiality rather than negligence. Nonetheless, the precedent 
is there to recognize emotional distress as cognizable harm in data-breach 
cases. In contract cases, courts recognize the value of preferences without 
economic value. 
III. An Approach for Assessing Risk and Anxiety 
Many courts reject risk and anxiety as cognizable harms based upon 
concerns about the difficulty of assessing and quantifying a dollar value for 
risk and anxiety. Courts worry that plaintiffs can simply assert a desire for 
redress for increased risk and anxiety and that there is no way to evaluate 
their claims with rigor or concreteness. Courts express concern that 
preventative measures to protect against future injury are merely 
“manufactured” to generate cost. The overarching concern is that risk and 
anxiety are speculative, subjective and, worse, susceptible to manipulation 
by attorneys who desire to manufacture injuries out of a data breach. 
In this Part, we contend that risk and anxiety can be assessed in a 
sufficiently concrete way. Although risk might be difficult to measure with 
precision, factors exist that can be measured and quantified. Courts should 
determine whether a reasonable person would take preventative measures 
and, if so, assess the harm based on the reasonable cost of such measures. 
Whether, in fact, plaintiffs actually took such measures should not be the 
focus, as the test we propose is objective. In essence, risk can be assessed 
based on what it would cost to insure against such risk. A similar approach is 
suggested for anxiety. Courts should employ an objective standard, assessing 
whether a reasonable person would feel anxiety over any unmitigated risk of 
future injury stemming from a data breach. 
A. Assessing Risk 
1. Likelihood and Magnitude of the Future Injury.—Courts should 
examine how the use or disclosure of the personal data would affect the 
financial security, reputation, or emotional state of a reasonable person. If 
stolen data is posted on sites used by identity thieves, then a substantial risk 
exists that the data will be used for fraudulent ends.209 On the other hand, if 
a thief steals a car with a password-protected laptop and the data is encrypted, 
then there is little to suggest a substantial risk of identity theft. 
From a risk perspective, the likelihood and magnitude of future injuries 
fall on a sliding scale. A significant risk can exist with a low likelihood of a 
 
209. See In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1214–15 (N.D. Cal. 2014) 
(noting that the stolen personal information had surfaced on the Internet and describing the risk of 
misuse as impending and very real). 
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high-magnitude injury or with a high likelihood of a low-magnitude injury. 
For a major potential injury, even a small likelihood is a risk worthy of 
concern. 
In many cases, it can be challenging to assess the likelihood and 
magnitude of future injury with any degree of scientific precision. This is 
because the potential uses of the data are vast. Nonetheless, there are factors 
that suggest the likelihood and magnitude of future injury. Courts can assess 
how different types of data have been misused in the aftermath of similar data 
breaches. Courts can look at the means and methods used to exploit different 
types of data involved in data breaches. Courts should examine the extent 
that breached data can be aggregated with other available data and the harms 
that result from the use of the aggregated data. 
2. Data Sensitivity and Data Exposure.—Certain types of data are 
readily categorized as sensitive because their release poses a substantial risk 
of being used to perpetrate fraud and identity theft. Some personal data 
effectively amount to keys to a bank account, such as account information 
coupled with passwords, Social Security numbers coupled with driver’s 
license numbers, and medical-insurance information coupled with dates of 
birth. 
Information can be sensitive if it reveals embarrassing or reputation-
damaging matters that a reasonable person would want to conceal from 
others. The Ashley Madison hack resulted in the posting of highly sensitive 
information about married people’s desire to have sex with strangers and 
information about their sexual preferences.210 Beyond the embarrassment and 
humiliation, that data raises the substantial risk of bribery and extortion. 
These situations are easily understood as raising a substantial risk of 
fraud, embarrassment, or reputational damage. But that is not to suggest that 
the harm from data breaches involving more innocuous-seeming personal 
data is trivial. Personal data does not exist in a vacuum. It can be readily 
combined with other data to reveal sensitive information and thus cause harm 
to individuals. For instance, it might seem trivial if information about 
people’s mothers’ maiden names is compromised, but this data is often used 
for password-recovery questions and could compromise the security of 
personal accounts. The same is true for data about people’s favorite books, 
places of birth, and other facts that might not, in isolation, seem to be 
sensitive. 
Compromised data does not exist in a void. The world is teeming with 
data, and compromised data can be readily combined with data to cause harm 
to individuals. It is nearly impossible to figure out in advance all the possible 
 
210. Sakinah Jones, Note, Having an Affair May Shorten Your Life: The Ashley Madison 
Suicides, 33 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 455, 455, 457 (2017). 
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combinations and permutations. But one thing is clear: As more data about a 
person is compromised, it will become increasingly more possible to make 
data combinations that could be used to injure individuals. 
The sensitivity of data—and its potential to cause harm—can be the 
result of the data itself like Social Security numbers combined with birth 
dates. But it also can be the result of the aggregation of seemingly innocuous 
data with other data. Sensitivity and harmfulness stem from the potential uses 
of the data, and data is often not used in isolation. Because of these facts, 
courts should be careful to avoid rushing to a conclusion that compromised 
data will not cause harm just because the data might appear to be innocuous. 
3. Mitigating Actions.—Another consideration is whether the potential 
harm is reasonably likely to be mitigated by other actions. Consider the leak 
of credit card numbers. Although credit card companies are not required to 
reimburse customers for all fraudulent charges,211 many major credit card 
companies have a zero-fraud liability policy.212 Thus, where reasonable costs 
are likely to be reimbursed, this consideration should be kept in mind when 
assessing the likelihood of the harm. 
4. The Reasonableness of Preventative Measures.—Preventative 
measures to reduce harm can serve as guideposts to understanding risk in 
more concrete terms and to figuring out the current costs of future harm. 
What preventative measures are available to deal with a potential future 
harm? What are the costs and effectiveness of such measures? In the absence 
of efficient preventative measures, what would it cost to insure against the 
risk of future harm if such insurance were available? 
The ultimate barometer for this analysis is reasonableness. Courts 
should look at the degree of the risk. If there is significant uncertainty, courts 
should assess the reasonableness of trying to manage the uncertainty. A 
component of reasonableness would be evaluating the cost of preventative 
measures in relation to their potential benefit. Costly measures for a small 
chance of a modest harm would be unreasonable. Inexpensive measures for 
a small chance of a significant harm, however, would be reasonable—these 
considerations are the basis of contemporary insurance markets. 
The objection that plaintiffs can manufacture harms by incurring the 
costs of preventative measures would have no bearing on our objective test. 
It would not matter whether plaintiffs choose unreasonably expensive 
preventative measures or whether they pursue no preventative measures at 
all. An objective approach avoids the problem of the overly sensitive 
 
211. See 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a) (2012) (limiting but not disallowing cardholder liability for 
unauthorized credit card use); Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(b) (2017) (same). 
212. Whalen v. Michael Stores Inc., 153 F. Supp. 3d 577, 581 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). 
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plaintiffs or the overly cavalier ones. Courts do not need to take plaintiffs’ 
word for these things. 
In Clapper, the U.S. Supreme Court failed to understand risk. The Court 
expressed deep concern about people spending money on protective 
measures to manufacture standing.213 But there are ways to distinguish 
genuine measures from manufactured ones. The key issue that the Court 
should have analyzed in Clapper is whether the decision to take any given 
measure was a reasonable response to the risk of government surveillance. 
Instead of certainties, we need to shift the focus to risk because contemporary 
understandings of the world are based on risk. This is how most of the 
business and scientific world operates—by seeing things through the lens of 
risk. Moreover, a requirement of reasonableness will limit the ability of any 
plaintiff to manufacture standing. Courts can analyze whether a person would 
be reasonable in assessing the risk of surveillance (or fraud) and in 
undertaking preventative measures to address that risk. 
B. Assessing Anxiety 
As the law has recognized in other contexts, emotional distress should 
count as a sufficient basis to establish harm. A data breach might not exact 
immediate financial costs to people, but the leak puts people’s good credit 
history at risk of being blemished by fraudulent transactions in the future. 
That one’s credit is in jeopardy of becoming polluted can be the source of 
considerable anxiety, especially for people who anticipate engaging in 
pursuits involving their credit, such as buying a new home or looking for a 
new job. A data breach can raise a person’s risk of reputational damage, as 
seen in the Ashley Madison hack, and in turn result in significant anxiety.214 
But not every instance of emotional distress should be cognizable. 
Courts should assess whether a plaintiff’s emotional distress is reasonable 
under the plaintiff’s particular circumstances. This would help exclude 
disingenuous claims and those made by hypersensitive people. 
Reasonableness inquiries have weeded out frivolous claims of emotional 
harm elsewhere in the law and can do so in data-breach cases. 
Elements of certain claims can be viewed as protecting against frivolous 
attempts at recovery for emotional distress. Consider claims for intrusion on 
seclusion and public disclosure of private-fact torts: they provide redress only 
for privacy invasions that would be “highly offensive to the reasonable 
 
213. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 407–08 (2013). 
214. See Troy Hunt, Here’s What Ashley Madison Members Have Told Me, TROY HUNT BLOG 
(Aug. 24, 2015), https://www.troyhunt.com/heres-what-ashley-madison-members-have/ [https:// 
perma.cc/3M24-9TJX] (detailing numerous anxious and worried reactions by Ashley Madison 
members after the breach). 
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person.”215 Intentional infliction of emotional distress claims can succeed 
only if plaintiffs can show that their anxiety was caused by “extreme and 
outrageous” conduct.216 How might courts approximate such protections in 
negligence claims? Here too we can look to current applications of 
negligence law. Courts can assess whether the emotional distress is serious 
and genuine, as is done in cases involving workers with asbestosis who fear 
their increased likelihood of developing cancer.217 
C. Examples 
The nature of a data breach provides significant insight into the way 
courts should understand and estimate the nature of the risk and 
accompanying anxiety. Consider the following spectrum of scenarios: 
1. Attempted Fraud Against the Plaintiff.—Let’s consider a data breach 
where hackers attempt to use an individual’s information for fraudulent 
purposes. As discussed in Part I, courts have found that if hackers obtain a 
plaintiff’s personal data and use it for fraudulent ends, there is little debate 
about the existence of harm. Situations involving attempted fraud should be 
viewed in similar terms. They generally present sufficiently concrete 
evidence of a significant risk of injury. There is a very high risk of future 
injury in such cases, and courts should recognize that risk as cognizable harm. 
Suppose a fraudster obtains a plaintiff’s personal data and sells the data 
online to other criminals. Although no one has attempted to use the 
information yet, a substantial risk exists that this will happen. Courts should 
find harm under these circumstances. The only thing to cut against the risk 
of injury is if the data by itself or in combination with other data poses little 
risk of potential criminal use. That would be true of data stripped of indicia 
that could be used to reasonably connect it to specific individuals.218 
To return to a recent decision, in Bradix v. Advance Stores Co., Inc.,219 
the court dismissed claims for lack of injury where the plaintiff alleged that 
hackers obtained the defendant’s employees’ names, Social Security 
numbers, gross wages, and states where employees pay income taxes and 
used that information in unauthorized attempts to secure vehicle financing 
 
215. Citron, Mainstreaming, supra note 36, at 1827. 
216. DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 121 (2014). 
217. E.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 157–58 (2003) (allowing claims for 
damages for emotional distress resulting from the fear of developing cancer so long as the plaintiff 
proves the genuine and serious nature of the fear). 
218. But see Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New 
Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1845 (2011) (describing 
the difficulty of stripping personally identifying information of the indicia that connect it to specific 
individuals). 
219. No. 16-4902, 2016 WL 3617717 (E.D. La. July 6, 2016). 
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appearing on the plaintiff’s credit report. The court based its dismissal on the 
fact that there was no proof that the attempts at fraud had actually damaged 
the plaintiff’s credit score.220 That hackers had personal data and attempted 
to use it makes clear that there is a significant risk of future injury. Hackers—
whose identities are unknown and who remain at large—can use and will 
likely use the information for criminal ends sometime in the future. The past 
efforts of hackers make clear their intent to use personal data for fraud. The 
sensitive nature of the data increases the likelihood that hackers will be 
successful in future efforts to steal individuals’ identities for fraudulent 
purposes. Crucially, there is little that plaintiffs can do to mitigate the harm 
since Social Security numbers and names cannot be changed to avoid future 
fraud. 
2. Actual or Attempted Fraud Against Others.—Suppose a hacker 
obtains personal data of hundreds of individuals, including the plaintiff. The 
fraudster defrauds, or attempts to defraud, some of these individuals, but not 
the plaintiff. That hackers have victimized or have attempted to defraud 
individuals similarly situated to the plaintiff should be sufficient to establish 
a substantial risk of future injury. 
3. Fraudster Obtains Personal Data But Use Remains Unknown.—In a 
number of circumstances, fraudsters obtain plaintiffs’ personal data, but 
nothing is known about their misuse. In those circumstances, the precise 
motives of criminal hackers may be unknown. It is fair, however, to suggest 
that there is a substantial likelihood that hackers hope to use the data for 
criminal ends. Courts should not require proof that hackers had criminal 
motives. As a practical matter, the hackers’ identities are unknown and thus 
such proof is elusive. Crucially, there is no need to require it. Hackers’ 
criminal motives can be presumed. As the Seventh Circuit asked in Remijas, 
why else would hackers steal personal data if not for criminal purposes?221 If 
a burglar breaks into a house and takes the jewelry box, it is logical to assume 
that the burglar is interested in the jewelry. 
Again, much like the analysis of attempted fraudulent uses of personal 
data, courts should consider the types of personal data stolen and whether 
that data alone or combined with other data is likely to be used for fraud. 
Courts also should take into consideration if there are avenues for plaintiffs 
to prevent or curtail potential fraudulent uses of the data. 
4. Stolen Electronic Device with Personal Data.—Suppose a thief steals 
a portable electronic device containing a plaintiff’s personal data. Nothing is 
 
220. Id. at *1, *4. 
221. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text. 
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known about the use of the data. The device might have been stolen for the 
device or the data. Thus, the risk of misuse of data is unclear. To assess 
whether the device was likely stolen for the data stored inside or the 
hardware, courts can ask whether such devices have a significant market 
value independent of the data, whether the thief might have known of the 
nature of the data on the device, the nature of the data on the device and its 
sensitivity, and other things. 
This case could go either way. If the data by itself or in combination 
with other data is not readily usable for fraud, then this cuts strongly against 
harm. 
If the data is encrypted—and if the encryption keys are not 
compromised—then this factor would cut against finding harm. In those 
circumstances, it would be costly to decrypt the data, thus decreasing the risk 
that it could be used for criminal ends. 
5. Missing Electronic Device with Personal Data.—Suppose a portable 
electronic device containing a plaintiff’s personal data goes missing, and it is 
unknown whether the device was lost or stolen. This scenario is similar to the 
case above, although less is known. The device might just have been lost.222 
In cases involving missing devices storing personal data, the evidence 
generally would not support a finding of a sufficient risk of future injury. 
This is especially true in cases involving personal data that alone or in 
combination with other data would not be considered sensitive—that is, data 
that can be cheaply and easily used to commit fraud. However, if the data on 
the device is embarrassing or highly sensitive, then there might be sufficient 
emotional distress harm in the mere exposure of this data to others. Anxiety 
over the risk—not of fraud but of the data being disclosed to others—can be 
sufficient for harm if it is reasonable to feel such anxiety based on the data 
involved. Of course, if the data is encrypted and the encryption keys are not 
compromised, then there would be no harm. 
6. Personal Data Exposed Online.—Suppose a plaintiff’s personal data 
is unwittingly exposed on the Internet for a period of time. Nothing is known 
about whether anyone saw or used the data. This case is similar to situations 
involving missing electronic devices with personal data. There generally will 
 
222. This scenario is quite common. See, e.g., Linda McGlasson, Bank of New York Mellon 
Investigated for Lost Data Tape, BANK INFO SECURITY (May 27, 2008), https://www 
.bankinfosecurity.com/bank-new-york-mellon-investigated-for-lost-data-tape-a-862 [https://perma 
.cc/2KFA-JU7T] (discussing the uncertainty as to whether missing tapes were lost or stolen). 
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not be enough evidence to demonstrate a sufficient risk of future injury, but 
there might be reasonable anxiety if the data is sensitive or embarrassing. 
7. Personal Data Exposed in the Trash.—Suppose paper records with a 
plaintiff’s personal data are thrown away in a dumpster. The records are all 
recovered, but it is unknown whether anyone accessed them while they were 
exposed in the dumpster. 
The risk of future fraud and anxiety is lower here than the above 
examples. Unlike personal data posted online, paper records are more 
difficult to use than electronic data; the odds that criminals accessed the paper 
records, copied down the data, and left the records in the dumpster are low. 
The risk is especially small if the personal data is not sensitive. 
What if the personal data is highly sensitive? What if the data includes 
medical records?223 Given the low likelihood that such data was in fact 
discovered, anxiety about its misuse should be viewed as unreasonable. As a 
result, courts should not recognize risk and accompanying anxiety as 
cognizable harms. 
8. Improper Access by an Organization’s Employee.—Suppose an 
employee improperly accesses records concerning a plaintiff’s personal data. 
Nothing is known about the use of the data. 
The analysis will depend upon the nature of the data and what the likely 
motive of the employee was. A hospital employee snooping into a celebrity’s 
medical record can cause reasonable anxiety because of the exposure of 
private health data. This is a classic example of intrusion upon seclusion and 
there would be emotional distress harm under that tort. 
IV. Resisting Denial 
Recognizing data-breach harms has significant downstream 
consequences in our legal system. Judicial reluctance to recognize harm 
might stem from a desire to avoid creating more opportunities for litigation, 
especially class-action lawsuits. 
The law has various tools to provide redress for injuries, as well as to 
deter blameworthy conduct that leads to injuries. In data-breach cases, some 
of the most common tools include data-breach-notification laws, regulatory 
enforcement, and litigation. Data-breach-notification laws require provision 
of notice to people about data breaches,224 but they do little to redress any 
injuries caused. The cost of sending out breach-notification letters can serve 
 
223. This scenario has come up in state-attorney-general investigations. In such cases, AG 
offices have settled with pharmacies and medical practices for modest penalties and promises to 
undertake rigorous security measures. Citron, supra note 58, at 779 & n.211. 
224. Security Breach Notification Laws, supra note 109. 
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as a deterrent, but these laws are often strict liability and are not tied to 
blameworthy conduct.225 They thus do not deter the most blameworthy any 
more than the least blameworthy. Moreover, the cost of notification is not 
proportionate to the amount of harm that a breach might cause. 
Regulatory enforcement can be effective, and the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC), Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and state attorneys 
general, among others, have brought enforcement actions against 
organizations for data breaches.226 Regulatory enforcement is limited in 
extensiveness, as regulatory agencies are only able to pursue a small number 
of cases. The FTC, for example, has brought only about sixty cases involving 
data security since 2002.227 Moreover, individuals often have little say in 
whether enforcement actions are brought, and they lack much participation 
in the process. Regulatory enforcement waxes and wanes as agency priorities 
and personnel change. Not all state attorneys general vigorously enforce the 
regulation. 
Private lawsuits serve a function that these other tools lack. Such 
lawsuits allow individuals to have a say about which cases are brought. These 
lawsuits bring out facts and information about blameworthy security 
practices by organizations. They provide redress to victims, and they act as a 
deterrent. But there are many flaws with litigation as a legal tool to deal with 
data breaches. 
One concern is that runaway class actions could bankrupt companies. 
As one court noted, “for a court to require companies to pay damages to 
thousands of customers, when there is yet to be a single case of identity theft 
proven, strikes us as overzealous and unduly burdensome to businesses.”228 
 
225. Jane K. Winn, Are “Better” Security Breach Notification Laws Possible?, 24 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1133, 1146 (2009). 
226. Citron, supra note 58, at 792–93, 799. 
227. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY—UPDATE: 2016, at 4 (2016), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/privacy-data-security-update-2016/privacy 
_and_data_security_update_2016_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/QE3Z-6B4D]. 
228. Storm v. Paytime, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 359, 368 (M.D. Pa. 2015). However, harm might 
not necessarily lead to a dramatic increase in class action lawsuits. Under the current procedural 
rules, federal courts would not certify a class where individual issues of harm would predominate 
the case. See Alex Parkinson, Comment, Comcast Corp. v. Behrend and Chaos on the Ground, 81 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1213, 1214, 1223–25 (2013) (interpreting Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 
1426 (2013), to prohibit class certification where individualized damage questions predominate). 
Under both tests, context is an important consideration for the various factors. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(b)(3). This in turn may make it difficult to obtain certification for classes involving thousands of 
people. Consider a proposed class action in a case related to a data breach involving thousands of 
people’s home addresses. Context is key to determining if the disclosure would raise the risk of 
physical harm and emotional distress. Individualized hearings would be necessary to determine 
whether the sharing of home address raised the risk of domestic abuse or stalking. In such a case, 
the description of the class would have to be carefully tailored to the data-breach harms to overcome 
challenges to certification. 
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One problem endemic to data breaches is one we will refer to as the 
“multiplier problem.” This problem is caused by the fact that organizations 
can hold data on so many individuals that recognizing even a small amount 
of harm will be multiplied by a staggering number of people. These days, 
even a small company can have data on tens of millions of people. Judges are 
reluctant to recognize harm because it might mean bankrupting a company 
just to give each person a very tiny amount of compensation. Do we want 
bankruptcy-threatening liability for a data harm that only causes people a 
minor amount of harm? 
The challenge with data breaches is that although the harm might be 
small to many people, it can add up as hundreds and perhaps thousands of 
organizations cumulatively cause harm to people. Moreover, a small amount 
of harm to many people might add up to more harm collectively than a large 
amount of harm to a few people. 
Courts may also be concerned that class-action lawsuits for data 
breaches often do not provide much in the way of redress to individuals. 
These lawsuits can be slow, expensive, and punishing to the parties. Lawsuits 
can be so costly and time-consuming that organizations often settle just to 
avoid the pain of having the legal process resolve the case even when they 
think they will likely win.229 
Despite these concerns, which are legitimate, courts should not focus on 
them when evaluating whether there is a legally cognizable harm. Courts 
should analyze whether the law should recognize harms independently from 
the downstream consequences of such recognition. Often, these downstream 
consequences become conflated with the issue of whether there should be 
legally cognizable harm. Harm should not be denied merely because finding 
harm will involve facing challenging issues about the form and amount of 
redress. 
It is true that litigation is a flawed legal tool, but the other legal tools to 
deal with data breaches have limitations. New legal tools might work better. 
But none of these points should lead to failing to find harm. If there’s a nail 
that needs to be hammered into the wall, and a hammer is not available, the 
solution is not to deny the existence of the nail. We reach this conclusion not 
just based on principle or a blind commitment to conceptual consistency, but 
on pragmatic grounds. At first blush, it generally does not seem pragmatic to 
argue that courts should recognize harm even though it could produce 
undesirable consequences in the legal system. But there are undesirable 
consequences for failing to recognize harm, which include allowing harm to 
 
229. See Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance-Value Settlement Problem: 
Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REV. 1849, 1850–51 (2004) (“The civil justice system is 
rife with situations in which the difference in cost between filing and ousting meritless claims or 
defenses makes the nuisance-value strategy profitable”). 
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go undeterred. The consequences should be seen beyond the particular case. 
Data-breach harms in any one case might not be large for most individuals, 
but aggregated across many cases, the harms become much more significant.  
Moreover, there are adverse consequences with conflating issues and 
not addressing each in an honest and direct manner. These consequences 
affect society’s ability to grapple with problems of great social concern. Not 
recognizing data-breach harms is avoidant behavior that often leads to a poor 
response on two fronts. The first is that problems involving data-breach 
harms are not addressed. The second is that specific problems involving the 
way our legal system functions are ignored. 
If there is a legally cognizable harm, then the law should try to address 
it. If the problem is that the forms of redress and remedies cause problems, 
then these problems should be grappled with directly rather than avoided. 
Suppose a person’s job is to pick every apple on an apple tree. Some apples 
are high up in the tree and are difficult to pick. The person declares that they 
are not apples, so she does not have to pick them. This approach is not only 
dishonest—it is unproductive. A more honest and productive response would 
be to explore how to surmount the difficulties in picking them. Maybe a 
different method is needed. Maybe new tools can be created to pick the 
apples. Innovation and invention might lead to a solution, but this might 
never occur if the existence of the apples is denied. 
Denying problems stunts the law’s development and is one factor why 
the law struggles to respond rapidly and effectively to contemporary 
problems. A key reason why data-breach harms are not recognized as 
cognizable is because their recognition would push on many of the areas 
where the law is very gingerly developing. Some might argue that the law 
should turn away data-breach harms until it is fully prepared to embrace 
them. That view, however, ignores the expressive function of the law.230 By 
rejecting data-breach harms, the law is saying that they are not worthy of 
redress. It is suggesting that they are not worth rethinking existing legal 
concepts or pushing harder on newer developing areas of the law. What 
originates in a lack of judicial imagination and fortitude becomes manifested 
in terms of data-breach harms being cast aside as insignificant or nonexistent. 
It is difficult to set aside the law’s current difficulties when tackling the 
question of whether the law should recognize data-breach harms. Bringing in 
the legal system with all its flaws might create negative outcomes. Shouldn’t 
we consider the consequences of how our legal system will handle a certain 
matter? 
The problem is that such an analysis takes the current legal system as 
fixed and unchangeable, and this is far from the case. The legal system will 
 
230. See Citron, supra note 162, 376–77 (“[B]ecause law is expressive, it constructs our 
understanding of harms that are not trivial.”). 
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never grow or mature if it is not challenged. The consequences might be 
worse in the short term, but this sacrifice might yield better results in the long 
term. Our legal system already has many different tools to redress harm, and 
has evolved considerably over the years. 
Moreover, the existence of problems with the legal system cuts both 
ways in a consequentialist analysis. Part of the decision about whether to 
accept and live with something is how well it functions. If the legal system 
functions fairly well, then one might be more accepting of it. The further 
away the legal system is from acceptable, the stronger the argument for 
changing it. Thus, the worse the failings of our legal system, the better it is 
to push on it. 
Additionally, denial of harm is not the only escape valve that the legal 
system can employ. Escape valves can be created at nearly any point in the 
process. Instead of addressing difficulties in how the legal system will handle 
cases when determining whether data harm exists, courts could address those 
difficulties and make compromises when actually addressing those cases. 
Rather than create a fiction that harm does not exist, why not create other 
fictions more directly on point and responsive to the problems for which they 
are being created? 
Generally, those who cause wide-scale harm must pay for it. If a 
company builds a dam and it bursts and floods a town, that company must 
pay.231 But with data-breach harms, courts are saying that companies should 
be off the hook and should not be made to internalize the harm. To the extent 
that there ought to be limits on liability for data harm, such limits are best 
addressed directly rather than through denying the existence of data-breach 
harm. For instance, not all harms might need to be addressed via damages 
and could be dealt with through various forms of equitable remedies and 
declaratory judgments. 
The problems with our civil justice system and class actions exist in 
many other areas of law and for many other types of harm. Data-breach harms 
should not be singled out. To the extent the civil justice system is flawed, this 
is an issue that ought to be taken up systematically, most practically through 
our legislatures. It is not an excuse for courts to take it upon themselves to 
close off the civil justice system from redressing a serious and important type 
of harm. 
Conclusion 
Looking across the body of jurisprudence of data-breach harms, it is fair 
to say that courts are reluctant to recognize data-breach harms. Various lines 
 
231. See Reservoirs, supra note 36, at 270–71 (analyzing data-breach cases as analogous to 
dam breach cases). 
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of cases that would support their recognition are ignored or narrowly 
interpreted. Courts rarely seize the opportunity to push doctrines in a 
progressive direction when it comes to data-breach harms. By contrast, courts 
are willing to extend the logic of related lines of cases in other contexts. Yet 
for data-breach harms, where precedent can be read flexibly and creatively, 
courts will rarely take the opportunity to do so. In many cases, courts brush 
aside or ignore precedent that would support the recognition of data-breach 
harms. 
With a better understanding of harms, we can appreciate why they are 
harmful, why the law struggles, and why the law needs to do more. Although 
there are legitimate concerns with recognizing data-breach harms, not doing 
so is akin to being an ostrich hiding its head in the sand. The law offers a set 
of tools that can be used to address harm, from compensatory damages to 
equitable relief (such as injunctions) to remedies (such as unjust enrichment). 
Our legal system needs to confront data-breach harms because real costs 
are borne by individuals and society and because ignoring them results in 
inefficient deterrence. Courts routinely avoid hard questions and ignore the 
anxiety people experience and the increased risk that data breaches cause. 
Yet in other areas of the law, courts have recognized such harms and placed 
manageable limits on their reach. As we have shown, those legal 
developments should inform how courts address data-breach harms. A path 
has been laid to help us work through the complexities of data-breach harms. 
Data-breach harm might often be intangible, but it still is very real. Data 
harm is frequently risk-oriented, but risk management is a standard part of 
the way that the modern commercial world operates. 
There are regulatory enforcement mechanisms to address harm, as well 
as many possibilities for legislation. What is the ideal mix of these tools? Are 
new tools needed? These are important questions to ask and ones we plan to 
address in future work. For now, though, it is important to note that these 
questions will not be asked sufficiently if no harm is recognized. 
In this Article, we have attempted to lay the conceptual groundwork for 
understanding data-breach harms and to demonstrate the legal foundations 
that can be used to help the law grapple with data-breach harms. When the 
law fails to recognize harm, the costs of our data-driven society are  
 
 
 
 
externalized onto individuals. These costs are compounding as data-breach 
harms aggregate. Not recognizing data-breach harms can lead to under-
deterrence of data security violations as well as inadequate investment in 
prevention. Dealing with data-breach harms will certainly be challenging, but 
the law is ready, and the stakes are of paramount importance. 
